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South Africa has experienced significant levels of reckless credit thus leading to over-
indebtedness of consumers. Furthermore, research conducted in 2008 and 2013 by 
the University of Pretoria indicated that there were abuses prevalent in emolument 
attachment orders (EAOs). An interesting aspect of the research was that credit 
providers were particularly interested in employed consumers, as their wages or 
salaries were deemed to be a form of security. The aim of this dissertation is to 
examine the link between reckless credit and EAOs. The main research problem 
revolves around the fact that credit providers do not conduct thorough pre-agreement 
assessments and have a tendency to subscribe to the tick box approach to 
compliance. Moreover, these pre-agreement assessments do not make provision for 
the inclusion of external market factors, which is essential to safeguard consumers 
against economic events. This dissertation argues that, at the point when reckless 
credit is granted, it is inevitable that default will occur thus leading to the culmination 
of an EAO. In this regard, the case of University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others; Association of Debt 
Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others; 
Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32 is important. The judgement illustrates how 
vulnerable consumers fell prey to unscrupulous credit providers who then took 
advantage of their salaries. An important aspect about the judgement was that section 
65J of the Magistrates Court Act has now been amended through a joint interpretative 
mechanism of severance and reading in. The Constitutional Court’s order now 
requires judicial supervision in the EAO process, whereby a magistrate issues the 
EAO. This dissertation examines the effect of this and how EAOs are currently 
regulated. It also discusses whether judicial supervision is the solution to ameliorating 
the law on EAOs. Qualitative research methods were utilised such as legislation, case 
law, textbooks and journal articles. While there are no statistics to prove the link, 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Since the promulgation of the National Credit Act,1  in theory, consumers have access 
to safe and reliable credit.2 By virtue of Apartheid in South Africa, and the 
discriminatory laws attached to the regime, credit was not easily accessible to the 
majority. During this period, the white minority were in a stronger position as this 
specific group had greater access to commercial credit.3 The need for the NCA arose 
from the lack of protection afforded to consumers previously and the lack of regulation 
in the consumer credit market.4   
In examining the consumer credit market in South Africa, reckless lending is a crucial 
problem which leads to the over-indebtedness of consumers and ultimately leaves 
consumers with little to no income.5 In South African law, the NCA sought to safeguard 
consumers against reckless lending, however, the past inequalities contributed to the 
rise in reckless lending.6 In addition to the problems surrounding the granting of 
reckless credit, in recent times, the abuses surrounding emolument attachment 
orders7 became prevalent and one of the reasons for such abuse identified by the Law 
Society of South Africa8 was reckless lending.9  
                                                          
1 Hereafter referred to as the NCA. Act 34 of 2005.  
2 JM Otto The National Credit Act Explained 3 ed (2013) 2.   
3 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32 at para 7.  
4 S Renke, M Roestoff & F Haupt “The National Credit Act: New Parameters for the Granting of Credit 
in South Africa” (2007) 28 Obiter 230.  
5 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.  M Kelly-Louw “The Prevention and 
Alleviation of Consumer Over-Indebtedness” (2008) 20 (2) SA Mercantile Law Journal 204.  
6  M Kelly-Louw “The Prevention and Alleviation of Consumer Over-Indebtedness” (2008) 20 (2) SA 
Mercantile Law Journal 204. As the majority was excluded from accessing credit during Apartheid, the 
legislature envisaged the inclusion of all South Africans in accessing credit. It is submitted that South 
Africa’s discriminatory past contributed to reckless credit as the credit market became more accessible 
and credit providers sought to circumvent the NCA in granting credit.     
7 Hereafter referred to as EAOs. Section 61 of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944 (hereafter referred 
to as the MCA) defines an EAO as: “An EAO includes a salary, wage, any form of remuneration and 
any allowances, whether expressed in money or not.” 
8 Hereafter referred to as LSSA.   
9 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. In 2013, the 
University of Pretoria conducted a follow up research surrounding EAOs and found that consumers who 
had a history of defaulting and evidently could not afford new credit agreements were granted new 
credit facilities. The report found that credit providers were particularly interested in consumers who 
were employed and had a salary, which could then be attached through an EAO. The report suggests 
that an EAO is a form of security for credit providers who provided unsecured credit to consumers. 
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There appears to be a link in existence between reckless lending by credit providers 
and the abuse of EAO’s.10 The primary aim of this research is to examine whether a 
link exists between reckless credit and EAOs, as identified by LSSA,11 case law12 and 
research reports.13 If such a link does indeed exist, this research will propose 
suggestions for amendment.    
1.1.1 Overview of the South African Credit Market  
The historical timeline of consumer related legislation around the globe reveals that 
South Africa, in enacting the NCA introduced over-indebtedness and reckless credit 
into South African law as new concepts.14 The reason for bringing the concept of 
reckless credit into South African law was due to the fact that previous legislation did 
not provide sufficient protection for consumers.15 While past inequalities rendered the 
majority unable to access credit, in introducing reckless credit, the legislature 
envisaged protecting consumers from the vicious trap of reckless credit.16 This is 
consistent with the South African legislature’s intention over the past fifteen years with 
other consumer centric legislation being promulgated with the primary aim of 
protecting and assisting consumers, such as: the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
and the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013.       
                                                          
Furthermore, the report found that some consumers had more than one EAO issued against their salary, 
indicating reckless credit as insufficient pre-agreement assessments were conducted.  
“The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” The 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2017.  University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others 
v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) 
SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); (2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015) at para 38. 
10 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13.University of 
Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others 
(16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); (2015) 36 ILJ 
2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” 
– a follow up report” The University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2017. 
11 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. 
12 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
13 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” The 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2017. 
14 J Otto “The History of Consumer Credit Legislation in South Africa” (2010) 16 (1) Fundamina 272. 
15 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5. 
16 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5. 
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South Africa has an active credit market, with many consumers relying on credit to 
access goods and services.17 In a recent financial study,18 it was found that in the 
context of the financial industry and wealth inequality, financial ignorance is an 
impediment and disadvantageous factor to consumers in conducting their financial 
affairs effectively. The NCR’s 2015 Annual Report19 statistics reveal that as at March 
2016, 143 620 consumers had applied for debt review20 while 449 467 consumers 
were under debt review.21  The NCR noted a concern that credit providers were not 
forthcoming in supplying documentation which is crucial to determine whether the 
consumer was a victim of reckless credit.22     
The position between credit providers and consumers is inherently unequal as the 
former exercises a significant amount of power, to the detriment of the consumers.23 
Credit is a fundamental part of society, however, a problem arises when the practice 
                                                          
17 The National Credit Regulator (hereafter referred to as the NCR) released its Consumer Credit Market 
Report for the second quarter of the year 2016. The NCR revealed that for the second quarter of 2016, 
the debt reflected in the debtors’ book was R1.66 trillion for the consumer credit market; this was a 
0.31% increase from the previous quarter of the year. As at June 2016, the amount of new credit granted 
to consumers was R108.32 billion. Upon an examination of unsecured credit in South Africa, the NCR 
found that it decreased for the second quarter, however, it increased by R49.37 million year on year. 
On the other hand, secured credit increased by 1.1% for the second quarter; on a year on year analysis, 
secured credit grew by R17.52 billion. “Consumer Credit Market Report” The National Credit Regulator 
available at https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/CCMR/CCMR%20June%202016.pdf, accessed on 28 
February 2017.   
18 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 17.  
19 23.5% consumers had impaired credit records while 17.7% of consumers were in arrears of more 
than three months, according to the 2015 Annual Report.   
20 A consumer can apply for debt review in terms of section 86 of the NCA. Section 86 (1) provides that 
a consumer can apply to a debt counsellor to have himself/herself declared over-indebted. Debt review 
allows for either the credit agreement to be declared as reckless or the consumers’ financial obligations 
to be rearranged in a manner to prevent over-indebtedness.   
21 “The National Credit Regulator Annual Report 2015/2016” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR%20Annual%20Report%202015-
16.pdf, accessed on 28 February 2017.  
22 “The National Credit Regulator Annual Report 2015/2016” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR%20Annual%20Report%202015-
16.pdf, accessed: 28 February 2017 at 31. 
23 An appropriate description of the unequal position between consumers and credit providers in South 
Africa has been described aptly by Yacoob J in AAA Investments (Proprietary) Limited v Micro Finance 
Regulatory Council and Another (CCT51/05) [2006] ZACC 9; 2006 (11) BCLR 1255 (CC); 2007 (1) SA 
343 (CC) (28 July 2006) at para 5: “It is universally accepted that money lending transactions are 
susceptible to abuse mainly because borrowers are usually in a much weaker position than lenders. 
Moneylenders can therefore easily exploit this vulnerability of the borrower, and some have been guilty 
of serious impropriety so frequently as to give rise to considerable concern. Moneylending transactions 
are therefore legitimately subject to legislative control in most parts of the world.” 
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of reckless lending becomes prevalent and consumers find themselves part of a debt 
trap. 24 This trap is exacerbated by the apparent abuse in the EAO process.25 
1.1.2 The National Credit Act  
Section 81 of the NCA requires that a credit provider conduct an extensive assessment 
of the consumer before granting credit. Section 80 (1) of the NCA lists situations when 
a credit agreement is reckless.26 The crucial aspect of determining reckless credit is 
the pre-agreement assessment27 which credit providers are required to conduct.28 The 
requirement is onerous but critically necessary in terms of section 81 (2) of the NCA, 
as was held in National Credit Regulator v Hirst.29  
1.1.3 Amendment to the National Credit Act  
Initially, credit providers were permitted to determine their own mechanisms to conduct 
such assessment as per section 82 of the NCA.30 Considering the significant 
prevalence of reckless lending and consumers’ over-indebtedness, the Affordability 
                                                          
24 J Campbell “The Excessive Cost of Credit on Small Money Loans under the National Credit Act 34 
of 2005” (2007) 19 (3) SA Mercantile Law Journal 253. 
25 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. 
26 (a) the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by section 81(2), irrespective of 
what the outcome of such an assessment might have been at the time; or  
(b) the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required by section 81(2), entered into the 
credit agreement with the consumer despite the fact that the preponderance of information available to 
the credit provider indicated that 
 
(i) the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate his risks, costs or obligations 
under the proposed credit agreement; or 
 
(ii) entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer over-indebted. 
27 Section 81 (2) of the NCA: A credit provider must not enter into a credit agreement without first taking 
reasonable steps to assess –  
(a) the proposed consumer’s – 
 
(i) general understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the proposed credit, 
and of the rights and obligations of a consumer under a credit agreement; 
 
(ii) debt re-payment history as a consumer under credit agreements; 
 
(iii) existing financial means, prospects and obligations; and 
 
(b) whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that any commercial purpose may prove to be 
successful, if the consumer has such a purpose for applying for that credit agreement 
28 Scholtz (note 5 above;11.5.3).  
29 [2015] ZANCT 18 (29 October 2015).  
30 Through an examination of the case law, the courts provided guidance in each circumstance as to 
whether a credit provider conducted a sufficient pre-agreement assessment. In Horwood v First Rand 
Bank Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 121 (21 September 2011), it was held that it is an objective determination, 
combined with the facts and circumstances of the case which would ultimately determine whether a 
pre-agreement assessment was conducted.     
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Assessment Guidelines31 were published32 by the Department of Trade and Industry. 
The Affordability Assessment Guidelines seeks to set minimum standards for 
evaluating consumer credit, to curtail reckless lending.      
They were introduced because credit providers were given unlimited freedom in 
developing their own assessment mechanisms and no set method existed within the 
credit industry.33 Moreover, National Treasury and the Banking Association of South 
Africa (BASA) released a joint statement in 2012 identifying unscrupulous lending 
practices in the credit market (evidenced by statistics), which were ultimately 
compromising the financial position of consumers.34 The various stakeholders agreed 
to review the lending practices to ensure it does not contribute further to reckless 
lending.35  In assessing the prevalence of reckless credit and debt, BASA, the NCR 
and National Treasury were in agreement that one standard to assess affordability of 
consumers’ required development.36    
Consequently, following the joint statement by National Treasury and BASA, the 
National Credit Amendment Act 19 of 2014 includes amendments consistent with the 
Affordability Assessment Guidelines. This seeks to ameliorate the previous position 
by creating minimum standards. This amendment provides that a credit provider may 
still develop its own evaluative mechanisms, however, these mechanisms must be in 
line with the Affordability Assessment Guidelines.37  This amendment has significantly 
                                                          
31 GN 10382 of GG 38557, 13/03/2015.  
32 M Kelly-Louw “The 2014 credit information amnesty regulations: what do they really entail?” (2015) 
48 (1) De Jure 95.  
33  JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6.  
34 “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 17 March 2017.   
35 “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 17 March 2017.   
36 “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 17 March 2017.   
37 Section 82 (1) and (2) of the NCA.  
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changed the previous position under the NCA where credit providers were given 
freedom38 to develop their own evaluative mechanisms.39       
1.1.4 Emolument Attachment Orders  
An EAO is a popular debt collection mechanism.40 It is a court order utilised to execute 
against a civil judgement and it obliges the employer of a judgment debtor to pay to 
the judgement creditor a portion of the judgement debtor’s wage/salary.41 The portion 
attached will then be paid to the judgement creditor until the debt is satisfied.42 The 
wording of section 65J of the MCA allows credit providers to merely obtain the debtor’s 
consent or authorisation of the court.43 The popular process was to obtain the debtor’s 
consent and approach the clerk of court to give effect to the EAO.  
In 2008, the University of Pretoria conducted research into EAOs and its prevalence 
in South Africa.44 In the public sector, a total of 216 857 employees had EAOs issued 
against their salaries.45 In conducting their study, the research team identified that 
EAOs were plagued with abuses. The research revealed that consumers had 
significant portions of their salaries attached, some consumers had more than one 
EAO issued against their salaries.46 As court officials were responsible for the issuing 
                                                          
38 “Credit sales slump: The new normal for fashion retailers” Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/companies-and-deals/credit-sales-slump-the-new-normal-for-
fashion-retailers/, accessed on18 March 2017).  Moneyweb investigated major fashion retailers who 
sell a significant amount of clothing on credit to customers, after the Affordability Assessment guidelines 
came into effect. Foshini noted a 30% decrease relating to new store cards. On the other hand, 
Truworths noted a decrease from 30% to 24% in new store cards and estimated a R200 – 250 million 
estimate in loss of credit sales.     
39 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6 (e).  
40 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017 at 56. 
41 Section 65J (1) (b) (i) of the MCA.  
42 Section 65J (1) (b) (ii) of the MCA.  
43 Section 65J (2) (a) of the MCA. 
44  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017.  
45  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017 at 97. 
46  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017 at 13.  
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of EAOs, it was found that these officials did not understand the matter before them, 
which led to an unjust determination.47 In the context of employers, it was found that 
they did not necessarily understand how to verify EAOs.48 Employers also admitted 
that such deductions were excessive and deprived an employee of the full benefit of 
his/her salary. 49  
The University of Pretoria conducted follow up research in 2013 to determine how 
many employees in South Africa had EAOs issued against their salaries.50 As at June 
2013, 435 084 employees in the private sector had EAOs issued against their 
salaries.51 This research indicates that this is a popular debt collection mechanism to 
enforce a civil judgment. The call for the inclusion of judicial oversight arose in the 
EAO process as a lack of supervision on court officials having a wide discretion to 
grant such orders lead to disastrous outcomes.52 The skills of such officials still 
remained questionable and it remained controversial as to whether such officials 
understood the nature and severity of the matter before them.53 Both research reports 
recommended that a magistrate be the one to make the final determination as to 
whether an EAO be issued.    
The aspect of EAOs is relevant as it appears there is a link between reckless credit 
and EAOs, thus the research will examine whether such link is in existence.  
                                                          
47  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017 at 106.  
48 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017 at 119.  
49 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017 at 119.  
50 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders”-  a follow up report” The 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2017. 
51 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” The 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2017 at 78.  
52 B Young “The Legality of Emolument Attachment Orders” (2013) 14 (2) IMFO: Official Journal of the 
Institute of Municipal Finance Officers 21.  
53 B Young “The Legality of Emolument Attachment Orders” (2013) 14 (2) IMFO: Official Journal of the 
Institute of Municipal Finance Officers 21. 
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1.1.5 Stellenbosch Law Clinic Litigation     
The turning point for EAOs came in the form of litigation instituted by the University of 
Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and other stakeholders. This High Court and 
Constitutional Court litigation, is important to the research as it serves as a foundation 
for the changes which have occurred to the law on EAOs. The crucial aspect 
surrounding the litigation for this research is the inclusion of mandatory judicial 
oversight, which seemingly can ameliorate the abuses prevalent in the EAO system.   
On 8 July 2015, Desai J 54  declared the relevant sections of section 65J of the MCA 
unconstitutional for failing to provide judicial oversight.55  Thereafter, on 13 September 
2016, the Constitutional Court56 delivered its judgement where it did not confirm the 
High Court’s order for constitutional invalidity. Instead, in its order, the Constitutional 
Court through a joint interpretive mechanism of reading in and severance57 ordered 
the inclusion of mandatory judicial oversight in the granting of EAOs.58 The judgement 
                                                          
54 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
55 Para 94: “2. It is declared that: 
2.1 the words “the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing” in section 65J(2)(a) of the 
Magistrates’ Act 32 of 1944 (“the Magistrates’ Court Act”) and; 
2.2 section 65J(2)(b)(i) and section 65J(2)(b)(ii) of the Magistrates’ Court Act, are inconsistent with the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (“the Constitution”) and invalid to the extent that 
they fail to provide for judicial oversight over the issuing of an emolument attachment order against a 
judgment debtor.” 
56 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32.  
57  University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32 at para 209. 
58 Para 212: “8. It is declared that section 65J(2)(a) and (b) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 reads 
as follows: 
“65J.   Emoluments attachment orders 
. . . 
(2)     An emoluments attachment order shall not be issued— 
(a)       unless the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing or and the court has so authorised 
after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that an emoluments attachment order be issued and 
that the amount is appropriate, whether on application to the court or otherwise, and such authorisation 
has not been suspended; or 
(b)       unless the judgment creditor or his or her attorney has first— 
(i)        sent a registered letter to the judgment debtor at his or her last known address advising 
him or her of the amount of the judgment debt and costs as yet unpaid and warning him or her 
that an emoluments attachment order will may be issued if the said amount is not paid within 
ten days of the date on which that registered letter was posted; and 
(ii)      filed with the clerk of the court an affidavit or an affirmation by the judgment creditor or a 
certificate by his or her attorney setting forth the amount of the judgment debt at the date of the 
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was hailed as a victory for the poor and for all those consumers who suffered 
prejudice.59 The nature of the order is prospective60 and to operate with effect from the 
handing down of the judgement. In effect, this means that the debtor’s consent would 
have to be obtained as well as the approval of a magistrate.61  
1.1.6 The Link Between Reckless Credit and Emolument Attachment Orders 
Since South Africa has an active credit market, it is submitted that while credit is 
fundamental, it is required to be exercised in a responsible manner. In the event of an 
allegation of reckless lending, unless a consumer raises a defence of reckless credit,62 
the credit provider will proceed to execute against the debtor in the event of default. 
Upon default by the consumer on a credit agreement and once judgement63 has been 
obtained, amongst the other enforcement mechanisms, an EAO may be issued 
against the debtor’s salary. It is submitted that when reckless credit is granted, and 
default occurs, an effective and popular means of debt collection exists in the form of 
an EAO.64 Consequently, on the face of it, there certainly appears to be a link between 
reckless credit and EAOs.65 
                                                          
order laying down the specific instalments, the costs, if any, which have accumulated since that 
date, the payments received since that date and the balance owing and declaring that the 
provisions of subparagraph (i) have been complied with on the date specified therein.; and 
(iii)     been granted an order of court authorising that an emoluments attachment order be 
issued after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that the order be issued and that the 
amount is appropriate.” 
59 “Ground-breaking garnishee order judgement a victory for the poor” Moneyweb 13 September 2016 
available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/ground-breaking-garnishee-order-
judgement-a-victory-for-the-poor/, accessed on 1 March 2017.  
60  University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32 at para 211.  
61  University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32 at para 212.  
62 Section 83 of the NCA. If a consumer alleges that a credit agreement is reckless, the onus remains 
of the consumer to prove such allegation and must be proved on a balance of probabilities.    
63 Section 58 of MCA.  
64 S Pete…et al. Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide. 2 ed. (2011) 347. “Is the EAO on your pay 
unlawful?” IOL available at http://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/is-the-eao-on-your-pay-unlawful-
1883791, accessed on 17 April 2017. 
65 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. University of 
Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others 
(16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); (2015) 36 ILJ 
2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” 
– a follow up report” The University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017. 
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There has been significant controversy surrounding the abuses of the EAO process, 
the extent to which was highlighted by the BASA and National Treasury.66 The BASA 
agreed it would advise its members not to utilise EAOs as a debt enforcement 
mechanism, owing to the various flaws inherent in the process.67       
1.2 Statement of Purpose and Rationale for the Study  
The purpose of the dissertation is to examine the link between reckless lending and 
the eventual culmination of an EAO. The dissertation will also consider the legal effect 
of the Constitutional Court judgement in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, relating to 
the mandatory requirement of judicial oversight and the subsequent MCA 
amendments.  
The key research problem revolves around whether a link between reckless credit and 
the culmination of an EAO exists. When EAOs are granted against an employee’s 
salary, the problem ultimately begins when reckless credit is granted to the consumer. 
As alluded to above, it is essential that the pre-agreement assessment is done in good 
faith and reflects an accurate description of the consumer’s financial affairs. Credit 
providers, before the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, utilised EAOs as the primary debt 
collection mechanism to ensure that a debt was repaid.68 Consequently, insofar as 
EAOs are abused by some unscrupulous credit providers and attorneys, as evidenced 
by empirical statistics,69 then it seems that if reckless credit is granted, it is probable 
that the unscrupulous credit provider who provides the reckless credit will likely rely 
on EAOs.   
                                                          
66  “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 17 March 2017. 
67 “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 17 March 2017. 
68 B Bentley. "Separating the baby and the bath water - garnishee and emoluments attachment orders." 
De Rebus. (2013).  
69 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2017. “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to 
“garnishee orders” – a follow up report” University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 1 March 2017. 
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There are no sound statistics to suggest that following the joint decision by the BASA 
and National Treasury EAOs have reduced. The problem is, once a consumer falls 
into a debt trap, unless intervention is sought, the chances of an EAO issued against 
the salary/wage increase. This dissertation will seek to inquire what would be the most 
appropriate method to curtail reckless lending and how this link, if in existence, to 
EAOs can be resolved. It is submitted that unless the law pertaining to reckless credit 
is strengthened, South Africans will find themselves over indebted.   
1.3 Research Questions 
1) In terms of South African law, what is reckless credit? 
1.1 What are the mechanisms that are required to safeguard vulnerable 
consumers against reckless credit?  
2) Does a link exist between reckless credit and EAOs?  
2.1 How does reckless credit contribute to the problems surrounding   
EAOs? 
3) In light of the Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgment, how are EAOs currently 
regulated?  
3.1 Is judicial oversight the solution to improve the law on EAOs? 
1.4 Overview of Chapters  
Chapter 2 will critically analyse the concept of reckless credit in South African law. It 
will be discussed with specific reference to the appropriate sections of the NCA, 
including case law.  
Chapter 3 seeks to determine whether a link exists between reckless credit and EAOs. 
The chapter will consider the role of reckless lending, and how financial ignorance 
contributes to the detriment of consumers, when unscrupulous credit providers take 
advantage of consumers.      
Chapter 4 will analyse EOAs and the current regulation in South African law. The High 
Court and Constitutional Court judgements from the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case will 
be examined, including the order from the latter court and its effect. In addition to this, 
the chapter will analyse the amendments to the MCA, surrounding judicial oversight 
and the statutory maximum of 25%. To propose an amendment to the law, the chapter 
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will conduct a brief foreign comparative analysis with the laws of Germany, Botswana 
and the United Kingdom (England and Wales) pertaining to the statutory maximum 
imposed by the legislature.  
Chapter 5 will conclude the paper and contain recommendations surrounding reckless 
lending and EAOs. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
The research methodology for this dissertation will be qualitative in nature, utilising 
desktop research. This dissertation will obtain information from its main source of 
information from legislation such as the National Credit regulating the law pertaining 
to reckless credit and other matters, the Magistrates’ Court Act pertaining to the law 
regulating EAOs. The research methodology will include published research of legal 
academics from accredited law journals and authoritative textbooks on the subject 
matters. Case law will also be drawn upon as authority.  A brief comparative analysis 
will be conducted in chapter four, to draw comparisons to the MCA amendments and 
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Chapter 2 
Reckless Credit in South Africa  
2.1 Introduction  
To demonstrate whether a link exists between reckless credit and EAOs, it is prudent 
to analyse the concept of reckless credit in South African law. Reckless credit is a new 
concept,70 introduced by the legislature to ensure that consumers who apply for credit 
do not fall victim to over indebtedness. In line with the legislature’s intention to ensure 
that consumers have access to safe credit and do not fall victim to predatory practices 
by unscrupulous credit providers, reckless credit is a crucial to South African law. 71  
In terms of section 80 of the NCA, a credit agreement is reckless if a credit provider 
fails to conduct the mandatory pre-agreement assessment.72 Furthermore, if a credit 
provider conducts a pre-agreement assessment which reveals that the consumer will 
become over-indebted73 and nevertheless proceeds with granting such credit, this 
conduct will also constitute reckless credit.74  Moreover, reckless lending will also 
occur where the consumer has a lack of understanding, which is further exacerbated 
by the general proposition that if the consumer were to enter into the credit agreement, 
he/she will thus be overindebted.75    
To illustrate the severity of reckless lending, the following case study creates a 
framework of the issue. In 2012, South Africa witnessed a catastrophic event, the 
Marikana massacre.76 Mineworkers embarked on a protest, demanding that their 
                                                          
70 J Otto “The History of Consumer Credit Legislation in South Africa” (2010) 16 (1) Fundamina 272. I 
Mulder Reckless Credit Under the National Credit Act: A Comparative Analysis (LLM thesis, University 
of South Africa, 2015) 10. ML Vessio “Beware the Provider of Reckless Credit” (2009) (2) Journal of 
South African Law 274. JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.1.   
71 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.1.  JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the 
National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.1.  
72  Section 80 (1) (a) of the NCA.   
73 Section 80 (1) (b) (ii) of the NCA. Section 79 (1) of the NCA defines over-indebtedness as: “if the 
preponderance of available information at the time a determination is made indicates that the particular 
consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in a timely manner all the obligations under all the credit 
agreements to which the consumer is a party.” 
74  JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.1. 
75 Section 80 (1) (b) of the NCA.  
76 M De Waal “Marikana: What really happened? We may never know” Daily Maverick available at 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-08-23-marikana-what-really-happened-we-may-never-
know#.WaZk7meQzMw, accessed on 30 August 2017.  “Police shoot strikers at South Africa's Lonmin 
Marikana mine” The Telegraph available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/9482175/Police-shoot-
strikers-at-South-Africas-Lonmin-Marikana-mine.html, accessed on 30 August 2017.  
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wages increase. A reason the protests erupted and the demand for an increase in 
wages was made was because many mineworkers were deep in debt.77 Upon 
investigation by the NCR, it was found that some credit providers in the Marikana area 
were not complying with the NCA.78  
The NCR found that these bogus credit providers were engaging in reckless lending 
and failed to conduct thorough pre-agreement assessments, especially failing to make 
a just determination to ascertain affordability.79 When some mineworkers were paid 
their remuneration, their financial woes would only deepen as they were left with very 
little after paying off existing debt.80 The Marikana massacre is one of many stories, 
which illustrates how vulnerable consumers are taken advantage of and how the NCA 
failed to enforce its mandate, before the amendments of 2014.81       
Since South Africa has an active credit market,82 adequate protection of the consumer 
is essential. From a historic perspective, the NCA was introduced as previous 
legislation did not provide adequate protection to consumers.83 This included credit 
providers not revealing to consumers the exact amount that they would be expected 
to pay, once interest and other costs were added to the original price of the item.84  
                                                          
77 D James “Deeper into a Hole? Borrowing and Lending in South Africa” (2014) 55 (9) Current 
Anthropology 22.   
78 National Credit Regulator v Rustmar CC (NCT/8615/2013/57(1)) [2014] ZANCT 21 (23 May 2014). 
“Annual Report 2012” Credit Ombud available at http://www.creditombud.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Credit_Ombud_Annual_Report_2012_1370586659.pdf, accessed on 16 
August 2017. “Annual Report 2012/13” National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR+ANNUAL+REPORT+2012-13.pdf, 
accessed on 16 August 2017.  
79 “Annual Report 2012/13” National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR+ANNUAL+REPORT+2012-13.pdf, 
accessed on 16 August 2017. P Bond “Debt, uneven development and capitalist crisis in South Africa: 
from Marikana microfinance mashonisas to Moody’s macroeconomic monitoring” available at 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Bond%20Berlin%20paper%20on%20debt%20and%20uneven%20develop
ment%20in%20contemporary%20South%20Africa.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017. “The New Credit 
Law will Enable Government to Crack on Illegal Lenders” The Department of Trade and Industry 
available at http://www.dti.gov.za/editmedia.jsp?id=3043, accessed on 16 August 2017.  
80 “NCR raises alarm at unsecured lending in Marikana” Mail and Guardian available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2012-10-11-ncr-raises-alarm-at-unsecured-lending-in-marikana/, accessed on 
25 April 2017.  
81 M Bateman “South Africa’s post-apartheid microcredit-driven calamity” (2014) 18 (1) Law, Democracy 
and Development 118.  
82 As at March 2017, statistics from the NCR revealed that the credit market new credit totalled R116.46 
billion with 9.53 million credit applications. “Consumer Credit Market Report” National Credit Regulator 
available at http://debtfreedigi.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/CCMR-March-2017.pdf, accessed on 
20 December 2017.  
83 T Woker “Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind 
the promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act” (2010) 31 (2) Obiter 225.  
84 T Woker “Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind 
the promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act” (2010) 31 (2) Obiter 226. 
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Furthermore, the socio-economic problems present in South Africa led to the 
promulgation of the NCA.85 Stoop identifies socio-economic problems such as: 
consumers lack of educational, imbalance between credit providers and consumers, 
lack of financial knowledge and credit providers not providing a full disclosure of the 
contracts consumers were entering into.86   
Due to the fact that South Africa has a blooming credit market and emerging middle 
class following apartheid, the NCA was crucial in terms of safeguarding the economy 
along with consumers.87 In light of the fact that the NCA was introduced into South 
African law before the 2008 recession,88 it managed to safeguard consumers to an 
extent from the devastating effects of the credit crunch by ensuring that credit was not 
overextended.89  
Section 172 of the NCA repealed previous credit legislation such as: the Usury Act,90 
the Credit Agreements Act91 and the Integration of Usury Laws Act.92 In light of South 
Africa’s discriminatory past and Apartheid, the majority were excluded from accessing 
credit products and services.93 Thus, the NCA seeks to ensure that there is inclusion 
of all South Africans in the credit market.94 
While the NCA has sought to improve the stance on access to credit and give improved 
protection to consumers and the economy, it has presented its own problems. In the 
context of reckless credit, it was found that the NCA initially created more problems 
than solutions, thus the amendment to the NCA in 2014.95 This chapter will examine 
                                                          
85 P Stoop “South African consumer credit policy: measures indirectly aimed at preventing consumer 
over-indebtedness” (2009) 21 (3) SA Mercantile Law Journal 366. 
86 P Stoop “South African consumer credit policy: measures indirectly aimed at preventing consumer 
over-indebtedness” (2009) 21 (3) SA Mercantile Law Journal 366. 
87 JM Otto The National Credit Act Explained 3 ed. (2013) 2. 
88 “SA’s Recession: how did we get into this mess?” News 24 
https://www.news24.com/MyNews24/SAs-Recession-how-did-we-get-into-this-mess-20140610 
(Accessed: 27 November 2017).  
89 JM Otto The National Credit Act Explained 3 ed. (2013) 2. J Otto “The History of Consumer Credit 
Legislation in South Africa” (2010) 16 (1) Fundamina 273. 
90 Act 73 of 1968. 
91 Act 75 of 1980. 
92 Act 57 of 1996. JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 2.1.  
93 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 2.1. 
94 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 2.1. 
95 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 2.1. “Ensuring responsible market conduct 
for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News available at 
http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 16 August 2017.  The Banking 
Association of South Africa (hereafter referred to as BASA) and National Treasury found that 
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the previous stance initially proposed in the NCA and the subsequent amendments in 
2014. It will also include commentary on the current position pertaining to reckless 
credit.  This chapter will examine the concept of reckless credit and the safeguards 
which should be implemented to curtail reckless lending by unscrupulous credit 
providers.          
2.2 Reckless Credit under the National Credit Act 
2.2.1 Introduction  
The NCA defines reckless credit as “the credit granted to a consumer under a credit 
agreement concluded in circumstances described in section 80.” The legislature 
envisages curtailing reckless lending practices through promoting responsibility in the 
credit market by encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance of over-indebtedness 
and fulfilment of financial obligations by consumers,96 and discouraging reckless credit 
granting by credit providers and contractual default by consumers.97 The NCA also 
seeks to achieve the purpose of addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of 
consumers, and providing mechanisms for resolving over-indebtedness based on the 
principle that consumers must fulfil their financial obligations.98  
2.2.2 Instances of Reckless Credit  
                                                          
unscrupulous credit providers were engaging in practices such as reckless lending, thus contributing to 
over-indebtedness. It was also observed that there was an abuse in debt collection practices and the 
obtaining of garnishee orders and EAOs.  This was evidenced by statistics obtained from the South 
African Reserve Bank which illustrated that household debt to disposable income was 76.3% during the 
second quarter of 2012. BASA and National Treasury agreed that some form of mechanism was 
required to perform pre-agreement assessments, with an aim to resolve the issue of reckless lending. 
“Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at  
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017. 
96 Section 3 (c) (i) of the NCA.  
97 Section 3 (c) (ii) of the NCA.  
98 Section 3 (g) of the NCA.  
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In terms of section 8099 and 81100 of the NCA, reckless credit can occur when a credit 
provider fails to conduct a pre-agreement assessment of the consumer. A pre-
agreement assessment is a mandatory financial assessment which the credit provider 
must conduct, before granting the consumer the requisite credit. The consumer’s 
financial documents must be thoroughly examined to ascertain if he/she can afford the 
credit repayments. The mandatory nature of a pre-agreement assessment is a 
safeguard for both credit provider and consumer to ensure that the latter can afford 
the total cost of the credit. Furthermore, it is vital for a healthy credit market that 
consumers can repay credit providers the capital and interest of the credit.     
According to section 80 of the NCA, the first instance of reckless lending occurs under 
section 80 (1) (a) of the NCA. This is when a credit provider fails to outright conduct a 
pre-agreement assessment of the consumer.101 Failure to conduct the pre-agreement 
                                                          
99 (1) A credit agreement is reckless if, at the time that the agreement was made, or at the time when 
the amount approved in terms of the agreement is increased, other than an increase in terms of section 
119(4) - 
(a) the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by section 81(2), irrespective 
of what the outcome of such an assessment might have 
concluded at the time; or 
(b) the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required by section  
81(2), entered into the credit agreement with the consumer despite the fact that 
the preponderance of information available to the credit provider indicated 
that - 
(i) the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate the consumer’s risks, 
costs or obligations under the proposed credit agreement; or 
(ii) entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer overindebted. 
(2) When a determination is to be made whether a credit agreement is reckless or not, the person 
making that determination must apply the criteria set out in subsection (1) as they existed at the time 
the agreement was made, and without regard for the ability of the consumer to risks, costs or obligations 
under the proposed credit agreement; or  
(a) meet the obligations under that credit agreement; or 
(b) understand or appreciate the risks, costs and obligations under the proposed credit 
agreement, at the time the determination is being made. 
100 (1) When applying for a credit agreement, and while that application is being 
considered by the credit provider, the prospective consumer must fully and truthfully 
answer any requests for information made by the credit provider as part of the 
assessment required by this section. 
(2) A credit provider must not enter into a credit agreement without first taking  
reasonable steps to assess - 
(a) the proposed consumer’s- 
(i) general understanding and appreciation of the risks and costs of the 
proposed credit, and of the rights and obligations of a consumer under a 
credit agreement;  
(ii)debt re-payment history as a consumer under credit agreements; 
(iii) existing financial means, prospects and obligations; and 
(b) whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that any commercial purpose may prove to 
be successful, if the consumer has such a purpose for applying for that credit agreement. 
101 S80 (1) (a) of the NCA: the credit provider failed to conduct an assessment as required by section 
81(2), irrespective of what the outcome of such an assessment might have concluded at the time. 
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assessment automatically renders the agreement reckless.102 According to National 
Credit Regulator v Hirst,103 it is peremptory for a credit provider to ensure that a pre-
agreement assessment of the consumer is conducted. Moreover, if a consumer 
qualified for the credit and a pre-agreement assessment would merely reaffirm such 
qualification, the pre-agreement assessment must still be conducted in conformity with 
section 80 and 81 of the NCA.104  
It is submitted that credit providers must take every reasonable step to ensure that a 
pre-agreement assessment of the consumer is conducted, in a thorough fashion.105 
Furthermore, a credit provider must conduct a pre-agreement assessment with the 
same degree of care and skill for all consumers. Thus, irrespective of the consumer’s 
income capacity, this mandatory pre-agreement assessment must be conducted in a 
conformed fashion, considering all relevant factors of the consumer. 
The second instance of reckless credit occurs under section 80 (1) (b) of the NCA. 
This is when a credit provider conducts the pre-agreement assessment in terms of 
section 81 (2) of the NCA, however, the credit provider ignores the fact that based on 
the information before him/her that the consumer failed on the requirements as per the 
NCA.106 This conduct is deemed to be reckless because despite the fact that a pre-
agreement assessment was conducted, the credit provider ignored the requirements 
dictated by the NCA.107  It appears therefore as if the legislature envisaged that the 
consumer understand the process of how credit works and the actual amount of 
                                                          
Absa Bank v Trustees for the Time Being of the Coe Family Trust and Others (24190/2009) [2010] 
ZAWCHC 206; 2012 (3) SA 184 (WCC) (1 September 2010): “Section 81(4) needs to be read together 
with section 81(2). It clearly gives the credit provider a defence in terms of the overall purpose of the 
Act, to ensure fairness to both parties in circumstances where the consumers fail to fully and truthfully 
answer any request for information made by the credit provider as part of its assessment. But, if an 
assessment was not undertaken in the first place, then section 81(4) is of no relevance.” 
102 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.2. 
 
103 [2015] ZANCT 18 (29 October 2015) at para 13.  
104 See section 80 (1) (a) of the NCA. JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.2. 
105 P Stoop and M Kelly-Louw “The National Credit Act Regarding Suretyships and Reckless Lending” 
(2011) 14 (2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 88.  
106 Section 80 (1) (b) of the NCA: (b) the credit provider, having conducted an assessment as required 
by section 81(2), entered into the credit agreement with the consumer despite the fact that the 
preponderance of information available to the credit provider indicated that - 
(i) the consumer did not generally understand or appreciate the consumer’s 
(ii) entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer over indebted. 
107 See section 80 (1) (b) (i) and (ii) of the NCA. JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act 
(2008) 11.5.2. 
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money that is going towards repaying the debt, thus promoting and ensuring 
transparency.108         
From a consumer protection perspective, the second instance seeks to guard a 
consumer against an unscrupulous credit provider. Moreover, in promoting 
transparency, the consumer is actively involved throughout the entire process. The 
second instance is important to curtail reckless lending because it creates a duty upon 
credit providers to engage with the material before them such as the proof of income 
documents and the consumer herself. Furthermore, it is vital that credit providers 
guard against creating over-indebtedness and uninformed consumers, who are not 
aware of their obligations and associated risks of the credit agreement.    
The third instance of reckless credit is envisaged by section 80 (1) (b) (ii) of the NCA.109 
It refers to a scenario where reckless credit could lead to indebtedness.110 When a 
consumer approaches a credit provider, it may well be that he/she is not over indebted 
at that point in time, however, a situation could arise whereby the consumer becomes 
indebted at a further point in time by him/her entering into the credit agreement.111  
It is submitted that in such a situation, the credit provider needs to exercise caution in 
such a situation and not merely adopt a tick approach. There is an onerous duty upon 
a credit provider to ensure that a thorough assessment is conducted of the consumer, 
to guard against such an occurrence. A credit provider must scrutinise the information 
before him/her to ensure that the credit agreement which the consumer wishes to enter 
will not in fact render him/her over-indebted.112 To balance this aspect, a credit 
provider should ideally be required to only verify information where there appears to 
be a doubt surrounding its veracity. It would be time consuming and probably 
counterproductive for credit providers to be expected to verify all documents that 
consumers adduce.  
It appears as if the legislature envisaged a comprehensive approach to pre-agreement 
assessments and curtailing reckless lending.113 Apart from considering a consumer’s 
                                                          
108 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.2. 
109 Section 80 (1) (b) (ii) of the NCA: entering into that credit agreement would make the consumer 
overindebted. 
110 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.2. 
111 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.2. 
112 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.2. 
113 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 32. 
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financial position, a credit provider must ensure that the consumer does understand 
the credit agreement.114 Moreover, the time at which a credit agreement was entered 
remains crucial to the process as it provides an indication of reckless credit and the 
understanding of the consumer. 115 The third instance requires a credit provider to 
apply their mind and engage with the financial information of the consumer, in a 
manner which provides responsible credit and enhances the consumer’s credit 
wellbeing. Furthermore, it remains trite that a consumer must not become over-
indebted whereby he/she will be in a state which renders them unable to adequately 
fulfil their obligations under the credit agreement.  
Section 81 of the NCA appears to impose an onerous burden upon the credit provider, 
to ensure compliance with the section to curtail reckless lending. Upon an examination 
of the wording in section 81, the interpretation of the section leads one to believe that 
the legislature envisaged that the section be peremptory.116 As the pre-agreement 
assessment is an integral aspect of the credit determination process, a credit provider 
is under an obligation to ensure that the section is complied with and a thorough 
assessment is conducted.117 While credit providers have an onerous duty upon them, 
the consumer applying for credit also has a duty to ensure that he/she makes a truthful 
disclosure about his/her financial position.118  
2.2.3 The Defence of Reckless Credit  
If a consumer finds that a credit provider seeks to enforce a credit agreement that is 
inherently reckless, a consumer can raise this unlawful conduct as a complete defence 
to reckless credit.119 This is a statutory defence as outlined in the NCA and will be 
determined on the merits if raised by the consumer when a credit provider seeks to 
enforce the agreement.120 For a credit provider to counteract an allegation of reckless 
                                                          
114 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 32. 
115 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 32. 
116 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.3.  
117 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.3.  
118 P Stoop “South African consumer credit policy: measures indirectly aimed at preventing consumer 
over-indebtedness” (2009) 21 (3) SA Mercantile Law Journal 368.  
119 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.5.  
120 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.1. C van Heerden and A Boraine 
“The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” 
(2011) 44 (2) De Jure 411.  
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credit and when attempting to enforce such agreement, it must be set out in the 
particulars of claim that the pre-agreement assessment was conducted.121  
From a practical perspective, the defence of reckless credit may be raised by a 
consumer when the credit provider seeks to enforce the reckless credit agreement 
against the consumer.122 In theory, the consumer can raise this before the credit 
provider seeks to enforce the credit agreement. From the perspective of the consumer, 
he/she can challenge this at any point for the agreement to be set aside based on 
reckless credit. If the matter reaches the point of summary judgement, as with all 
proceedings at this stage, the defendant must show that he/she has a bona fide 
defence.123 Furthermore, when an allegation of reckless credit is made, the consumer 
must provide sufficient and material information.124 This includes the defence he/she 
is relying on and the nature of it. 125  The procedure follows basic civil law norms and 
the civil standard of a balance of probabilities.   
In terms of section 81 (4)126 of the NCA, a credit provider will defeat a reckless credit 
claim if it can be shown that the consumer failed to provide the correct information at 
the pre-agreement assessment stage. As alluded to previously, this section requires 
a consumer to make a truthful disclosure and answer all questions with accurate 
information. If it becomes apparent to the credit provider that the consumer was 
dishonest in his/her disclosure in furnishing information to complete the pre-agreement 
assessment, the Court or Tribunal presiding over the matter must then determine 
whether this misrepresentation had a link to the credit provider concluding his/her 
                                                          
121 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 411.  
 
122 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 411.  
 
123 Rule 14 of the Magistrates Court Rules.  
124 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 412.  
 
125 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 412. 
126 For all purposes of this Act, it is a complete defence to an allegation that a credit agreement is 
reckless if -  
(a) the credit provider establishes that the consumer failed to fully and truthfully 
answer any requests for information made by the credit provider as part of the  
assessment required by this section; and 
(b) a court or the Tribunal determines that the consumer’s failure to do so  
materially affected the ability of the credit provider to make a proper  
assessment.  
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assessment.127  A Court or Tribunal must be able to determine whether the pre-
agreement assessment would have revealed another result, however, if the 
information reveals that an aspect relevant to the determination would not quite affect 
the final outcome, then such defence will fail.128     
If a consumer alleges reckless credit, he/she bears the onus of proof on a balance of 
probabilities.129  In aiming to successfully raise this complete defence,130 a consumer 
is required to provide as much information as possible to substantiate such claim; 
consumers must also be warned against making vague allegations which contain no 
substance in proving reckless credit.131 This is to ensure that there is transparency 
and sufficient information to enable the credit provider to respond adequately.132  
In light of the fact that reckless credit is a new concept in South African law, the 
jurisprudence is still developing. Nonetheless, there is case law which has sought to 
explain the concept of reckless credit and its associated defences. 133 
2.2.4 Analysis of Applicable Case Law   
In the case of Mbatha,134 the defendant raised the defence of reckless credit at the 
stage of summary judgement against a credit agreement. The Court acknowledged 
that the NCA allows for a balancing act between the rights of credit providers and 
consumers.135 Thus, it remains vital that even if all obligations are suspended under 
the credit agreement by virtue of a successful defence of reckless credit, it would be 
inequitable for the consumer to still retain the asset.136  
                                                          
127 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.5. 
128 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.5. 
129 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 43. 
130JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.2.  
131 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 43 quoting SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; 
SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba (51330/09, 
52948/09, 53080/09) [2010] ZAGPJHC 24; 2011 (1) SA 310 (GSJ) (30 March 2010). 
132 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 411. 
133 Standard Bank of South African Ltd v Kelly and Another (23427/2010) [2011] ZAWCHC 1 (25 
January 2011). Absa Bank Limited v De Beer and Others (26749/2011) [2015] ZAGPPHC 903; 2016 
(3) SA 432 (GP) (18 December 2015). Absa Bank Limited v Potgieter (2344/2013) [2017] ZAECPEHC 
8 (31 January 2017).  
134 SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Mbatha; SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Molete; SA Taxi 
Securitisation (Pty) Ltd v Makhoba (51330/09, 52948/09, 53080/09) [2010] ZAGPJHC 24; 2011 (1) SA 
310 (GSJ) (30 March 2010). 
135 Para 31. 
136 Para 54.  
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The Court held that to successfully raise the defence of reckless credit, it must be 
shown:137  
1) Details about negotiations ought to be included leading up to the conclusion of 
the credit agreement, including parties involved, details about the credit 
agreement and circumstances under which it was signed.138  
2) The defendant must disclose his/her education and experience at the time of 
the pre-agreement assessment. Furthermore, the defendant ought to have also 
disclosed previous credit transactions entered into.139  
3) In the event the defendant raised over-indebtedness, this must be proved at the 
time the credit transaction was entered into. This includes information about the 
defendant’s potential income and expenditure. To substantiate the third aspect, 
the defendants were required to disclose the revenue that they would derive 
from the assets.140  
4) Information must be presented illustrating the defendant’s current level of 
indebtedness. To substantiate this, the defendant must furnish income and 
expenditure related information. This would enable the court to make a just 
determination about whether to suspend or set aside the credit agreement.141   
As the jurisprudence on reckless credit is still developing, these guidelines from 
Mbatha could be useful in providing guidance to a consumer who finds himself/herself 
trapped in a reckless credit agreement. Moreover, it would assist a consumer in 
successfully proving reckless credit. It appears as if these guidelines are stringent 
upon a consumer and rightfully this onus should be upon the credit provider.142  The 
opposing view, congruent with civil procedure principles is that the credit provider 
ought to make the necessary allegations in the particulars of claim, pertaining to the 
pre-agreement assessment. 143  
                                                          
137 Levenberg AJ made the following remarks as to what would constitute sufficient information to raise 
a successful defence of reckless credit, in paragraph 55 of the judgement.  
138 Para 55. 
139 Para 55. 
140 Para 55. 
141 Para 55.  
142 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 412. 
143 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 413. 
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Furthermore, if the consumer wishes to defend such allegation to prove the contrary, 
sufficient material information must be produced.144 From a perspective of over-
indebtedness, it would strengthen the consumer’s defence if he/she discloses that 
before entering into the credit agreement, a truthful disclosure about his/her financial 
affairs was made.145    
From an academic perspective, the Mbatha judgement is viewed as a useful set of 
guidelines if the consumer raises a defence of reckless credit.146 In as much as the 
court provided comprehensive guidelines, it is argued that the court did not intend to 
create binding guidelines in the South African jurisprudence.147 On the contrary, it is 
viewed as providing some sort of guidance to courts regarding the information that 
needs to be furnished when a defence of reckless credit is raised.148  
Mbatha is a judgement which is indicative of idealistic reasoning from the judiciary 
because it does not recognise the difficulties that consumers face when dealing with 
a credit provider. An implication of the guidelines from Mbatha could be that even 
though a consumer has a bona fide defence, the onus to discharge is far too onerous. 
Unfortunately, consumers are in a weaker position and ignorance of the law is 
prevalent, owing to South Africa’s socio-economic framework. When faced with 
litigation, a consumer owing to ignorance of the law may not have the required 
documents and information to successfully prove reckless credit, as proposed in 
Mbatha. It is submitted that the judiciary must be cognisant of the practical realities 
facing South Africans and thus set guidelines which can be proven in court along with 
information easily accessible.             
                                                          
144 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 413. 
145 C van Heerden and A Boraine “The money or the box: perspectives on reckless credit in terms of 
the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2011) 44 (2) De Jure 413. 
146 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 45. Since the judgement, these guidelines have not 
been adopted by our courts. To demonstrate the effectiveness and the treatment of the Mbatha 
judgement, it was referred to in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Mvelase (4096/10) [2010] ZAKZPHC 74; 2011 (1) 
SA 470 (KZP) (26 October 2010) and considered in Pelzer v Nedbank Ltd (2011 (4) SA 388 (GNP)) 
[2010] ZAGPPHC 119; 14160/09 (17 September 2010). 
147 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 45. 
148 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 45. 
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In the case of Horwood v First Rand Bank Ltd,149  the applicant approached the court 
to set aside a credit agreement with the credit provider on the grounds that it was 
reckless. The applicant unsuccessfully raised the argument that the credit provider 
was required to verify the documents for the pre-agreement assessment.150  Horwood 
adds to the South African credit law jurisprudence as authority for the fact that while a 
credit provider is not expected to verify information, the credit provider is required to 
verify information where there appears to be a discrepancy.151 For example, this would 
be the case where an amount appears unreasonably low for fuel expenses where it is 
common knowledge that the consumer frequently travels.152    
2.2.5 Conclusion  
The case law pertaining to reckless credit has in some instances interpreted the NCA 
and created stringent guidelines. Moreover, the information required to raise a defence 
of reckless credit creates onerous obligations upon consumers. While reckless credit 
and its associated defence are new concepts to South African law, the NCA appeared 
to be in dire need of amendment to create some form of uniformity regarding how pre-
agreement assessments are conducted.   
2.3 The Affordability Assessment Guidelines and Amendment to the NCA 
2.3.1 Introduction  
As discussed above, the pre-agreement assessment forms an integral part of the 
credit granting process.153 Before the amendment to the NCA, the position was 
problematic pertaining to the assessment models and mechanisms which credit 
providers utilised to make their determination.154 It was problematic because credit 
providers could determine their own mechanisms to conduct pre-agreement 
assessments, leading to no conformity in the credit industry. 155 
 
                                                          
149  [2011] ZAGPJHC 121 (21 September 2011). 
150 At para 14.  
151 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 52. 
152 M Kelly-Louw “A Credit Provider’s Complete Defence Against a Consumer’s Allegation of Reckless 
Lending” (2014) 26 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 52. 
153 See 2.2 above.  
154 See 2.2 above.  
155 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
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2.3.2 Drafting and Interpretational Difficulties With the NCA  
Otto identifies three judgements where judges expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
NCA as it created more problems for the courts, as opposed to providing solutions for 
the credit industry and consumers.156 From the passages quoted by Otto, it is evident 
that the judges face problems in interpreting the sections of the NCA. The passages 
reveal that besides an interpretation hurdle, the legislation is probably not appropriate 
for South Africa and contains significant foreign influence.157  
This is a problem because certain concepts may be unknown to South African law and 
are not suited to the landscape of the country’s legal problems. Furthermore, the 
foreign influence found in South African law does not take cognisance of the socio-
economic factors and other problems present in the country.158   
It is submitted that Otto and van Deventer concur with the proposition that there has 
been a significant amount of foreign influence that the legislature relied on to draft 
certain key aspects of the NCA.159 With regards to the legislature not taking the 
requisite care to draft the NCA to suit South Africa, it appears as if certain aspects 
such as ensuring a balancing act between consumers and credit providers needed to 
be entrenched and introduced.160  
While the NCA is lawful and binding upon credit providers and consumers, the fact 
that the judiciary has been vocal in their criticism about the NCA should be concerning 
                                                          
156 J Otto “National Credit Act Vanwaar Gehási? Quo vadit lex? And some reflections on the National 
Credit Amendment Act 2014 (part 1)” (2015) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 584. Cases referred 
to by Otto at 585.   FirstRand Bank Ltd v Seyffert 2010 6 SA 429 (GSJ) at para 10: “I share the general 
frustration of my judicial colleagues around the country at the lack of clarity that features at least in the 
parts of the NCA with which one is concerned in cases of the kind now before me. A court is forced to 
go round and round in loops from subsection to subsection, much like a dog chasing its tail. Indeed, the 
language used in the Act from time to time suggests that foreign draftspersons rather than South African 
lawyers had a strong hand in preparing the text.”  Nedbank Ltd v National Credit Regulator 2011 3 SA 
581 (SCA) at para 2: “Numerous drafting errors, untidy expressions and inconsistencies make its 
interpretation a particularly trying exercise.”  
Starita v Absa Bank Ltd 2010 3 SA 443 (GSJ) at para 18.9: “The fact is that it is a badly drafted Act.” 
157 J Otto “National Credit Act Vanwaar Gehási? Quo vadit lex? And some reflections on the National 
Credit Amendment Act 2014 (part 1)” (2015) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 585 quoting Seyffert.  
158 J Otto “National Credit Act Vanwaar Gehási? Quo vadit lex? And some reflections on the National 
Credit Amendment Act 2014 (part 1)” (2015) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 584. 
159 S van Deventer “The enforcement of credit agreements through set-off: Evaluating the impact of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 “(2017) Part 2 The South African Law Journal 429.  
160 S van Deventer “The enforcement of credit agreements through set-off: Evaluating the impact of the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 “(2017) Part 2 The South African Law Journal 440. 
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to government.161 The criticism pertaining to interpretation difficulties and other 
aspects of the NCA are valid because the judiciary plays a significant role in consumer 
protection.  
The judiciary is important from an interpretation perspective as it ultimately delivers 
justice to the public and provides guidance through case law. The government policy 
in relation to the NCA is rational and lawful,162 however, such commentary and 
criticism should be welcomed as it would assist government in formulating its policy in 
a manner which is practical; furthermore, this would entrench the ideals of consumer 
protection and ensure the true purpose of the NCA is fulfilled.  
2.3.3 Lack of Conformity with Pre-Agreement Assessments  
Originally, section 81 of the NCA gave credit providers freedom to determine their own 
assessment models and mechanisms, to conduct pre-agreement assessments.163 
While this remained the position since the inception of the NCA, the NCR was 
permitted to approve evaluative mechanisms and models. Furthermore, the NCR was 
to publish guidelines as to what these evaluative mechanisms and models should 
encompass.164  
The previous position pertaining to section 81 was problematic165 and not well suited 
to the credit industry. It is submitted that it gave credit providers an unlimited amount 
of freedom/discretion which in turn was abused; this abuse led to the circumvention of 
the NCA and plunged consumers further into a vicious cycle of reckless lending and 
over-indebtedness. Moreover, it appears as if there was insufficient oversight over the 
credit industry and the mechanisms employed by credit providers.  
                                                          
161 J Otto “National Credit Act Vanwaar Gehási? Quo vadit lex? And some reflections on the National 
Credit Amendment Act 2014 (part 1)” (2015) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 584. 
162 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 2.2. 
163 S Monty “Affordability assessment regulations: consumer law / NCA” (2014) 14 (9) Without Prejudice 
29. The position prior to the amendment was problematic as there was no conformity in the credit 
industry, pertaining to pre-agreement assessment models and mechanisms. Furthermore, it remained 
unclear how these pre-agreement assessments were being conducted. Another aspect which 
reaffirmed how problematic this was, was the prevalence of reckless credit and over-indebtedness of 
consumers. JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 2.1. 
164 Section 82 (2) (b).  
165 S Monty “Affordability assessment regulations: consumer law / NCA” (2014) 14 (9) Without Prejudice 
29. 
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A drawback in terms of section 82 (3), which was like self-regulation,166  was that these 
guidelines were not binding upon credit providers; it is submitted that such drawback 
gave credit providers further freedom to engage in unscrupulous lending practices. If 
it was found that a credit provider utilised evaluative mechanisms and models, which 
led to an unfair determination, to the detriment of the consumer, the NCR could apply 
to the Tribunal under the then section 82 (4). The Tribunal could then order the credit 
provider to comply with guidelines published by the NCR or guidelines that were 
congruent with the industry norms and practices.167          
From the inception of the NCA and its purpose, it is evident that the legislature 
envisaged preventing reckless credit.  Due to the fact that credit providers were given 
complete freedom to determine their own evaluative models and mechanisms, the 
absence of legally binding guidelines curtailed the fulfilment of the objective to curtail 
reckless lending.168  In the absence of these legally binding guidelines, the Courts 
were tasked with evaluating a credit provider’s evaluative models and mechanisms, to 
determine if a fair pre-agreement assessment was conducted.169 It is submitted that 
while the courts sought to provide guidance on what constituted a proper pre-
agreement assessment, the credit industry required legally binding guidelines which 
were adequately legislated.     
 
 
                                                          
166 DP Strachan “An Evaluation of the Self-Regulation of Promotional Competitions in South Africa” 
(2016) 19 (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 3. Self-regulation is a form of regulation where an 
industry regulates itself, government does not have a role in this form of regulation. The previous 
position under the National Credit Act was similar to self-regulation as credit providers were not bound 
to government regulation and were free to develop their own evaluative mechanisms and procedures.   
 
167 Section 81 (4) (b). JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
168 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
169JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6.  Horwood at para 5: “The 
requirement of s 81(2) of the NCA is that the credit provider takes ‘reasonable steps to assess’ the 
matters referred to in that section before entering into the credit agreement. S 82(1) permits a credit 
grantor to… determine for itself the evaluative mechanisms or models and procedures to be used in 
meeting its assessment obligations under section 81, provided that any such mechanism, model or 
procedure results in a fair and reasonable assessment. The credit provider must accordingly take 
reasonable steps to assess the relevant matters and the mechanisms, models and procedures used by 
it must result in a fair and objective assessment. Whether or not a credit grantor has taken the required 
reasonable steps to meet its assessment obligations is in the light of the wording of these provisions to 
be determined objectively on the facts and circumstances of any given case.” 
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2.3.4 National Treasury and BASA Concerned About Reckless Lending 
Practices 
In 2012, National Treasury and the BASA expressed their concern about the high 
levels of reckless lending in South Africa.170 Statistics were obtained from the South 
African Reserve Bank which indicated that many South Africans were over indebted, 
and it was concerning that loans were made available to consumers who could not 
afford such credit.171 The statistics illustrated that household debt to disposable 
income was 76.3% during the second quarter of 2012.172 BASA and National Treasury 
agreed that some form of mechanism was required to perform pre-agreement 
assessments, with an aim to resolve the issue of reckless lending.173 
Furthermore, it was concerning that besides reckless lending practices, credit 
providers were abusing debt collection mechanisms.174 It was well understood 
between National Treasury and BASA that to enable the functioning of a healthy 
economy, effective measures needed to be imposed. Both parties agreed that there 
must be minimum standards to determine affordability of a consumer, which was 
mandatory for credit providers.  
Thus, the idea of introducing affordability assessment guidelines into law and the 
subsequent amendment to the NCA was decided.175 Moreover, BASA agreed that its 
                                                          
170 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017 at 
1. 
171 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017 at 
1. 
172 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017 at 
1. 
173 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017 at 
3. 
174 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at   
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017 at 
3. 
175 “Gordhan and BASA agree to improve responsible lending practices” Politicsweb available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/gordhan-and-basa-agree-to-improve-responsible-lend, 
accessed on 27 April 2017. 
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members would not utilise EAOs, owing to the issues prevalent in the system.176 It is 
submitted that the decisions made by BASA and National Treasury would have been 
to the detriment of unscrupulous credit providers and debt collectors.         
2.3.5 The Link Between Reckless Credit and EAOs 
To illustrate the severity of the problem of over-indebtedness and the prevalence of 
reckless credit in South Africa, follow up research conducted by the University of 
Pretoria into EAOs makes an interesting point about reckless credit.177 The research 
revealed that there were multiple EAO deductions against the salaries of 
consumers.178 Upon further investigation, credit checks and affordability assessments 
attributed this to reckless lending practices.179 Researchers found that credit providers 
were least interested in the credit history of the consumers and were far more 
concerned about employment status; this is because it would become easier to secure 
an EAO upon default.180  
These statistics and research conducted by the University of Pretoria supports the 
assertion that there is a link between reckless credit and EAOs. It must be borne in 
mind that reckless credit is the foundation of the problem, thus resulting in an EAO. 
The link is essentially created when an unscrupulous credit provider enters into a 
reckless credit agreement with a consumer, thus the eventual culmination of an EAO 
becomes highly probable. Furthermore, it creates a state of over-indebtedness as a 
consumer could not necessarily afford the repayments on the credit agreement.       
                                                          
176 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at   
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017 at 
3. 
177 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 17 August 2017.        
178 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 17 August 2017 at 55. 
179 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 17 August 2017 at 56. 
180 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 17 August 2017 at 56. 
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2.3.6 Initial Affordability Assessment Guidelines 
The Affordability Assessment Guidelines were the product of the objective of National 
Treasury and BASA to reduce reckless lending practices and thus encourage 
responsible borrowing practices.181 In order to achieve this objective, the NCR 
published draft guidelines in May 2013, with the aim in mind of eventually making it 
part of the NCA.182 The Affordability Assessment Guidelines are guidelines which 
credit providers must adhere to when conducting a pre-agreement assessment.183 The 
mechanisms and procedures as outlined in the guidelines aims to achieve conformity 
in the credit industry and to monitor credit providers’ activities.184     
The NCR published these guidelines with the following propositions: 
 • “Credit applicants prove their claimed discretionary income when it is above the norm for a person 
with their gross income and that such norms be determined as a percentage of gross income 
bands; 
• Credit providers consider all the credit applicant’s income, expenses and debt repayments when doing 
an affordability assessment; 
• Credit providers refrain from lending to the maximum of the consumers’ discretionary income and 
leave a margin of at least 25% of their discretionary income for adverse changes in the economy 
or the consumer’s circumstances; 
• That credit providers use the credit applicant’s current credit information as stored on one or more 
credit bureaux; 
• Credit providers process applications for credit within seven days from accessing an applicant’s credit 
information as stored on credit bureaux; and 
• Credit providers share credit application information on credit bureaux to allow for better affordability 
assessments to be made by other credit providers and to reduce credit application fraud.”185 
Following the above, the Affordability Assessment Guidelines were published in 
September 2013. Scholtz submits that these guidelines were better than what was 
                                                          
181 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
182 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
183 S Monty “Affordability assessment regulations: consumer law / NCA” (2014) 14 (9) Without Prejudice 
29 
184 S Monty “Affordability assessment regulations: consumer law / NCA” (2014) 14 (9) Without Prejudice 
29 
185 “National Credit Regulator” Mail and Guardian available at https://mg.co.za/notice/2013-06-04-
national-credit-regulator, accessed on 5 May 2017. “Public Notices” National Credit Regulator available 
at http://www.ncr.org.za/index.php/article, accessed on 28 November 2017.  
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initially published, which was probably due to the fact that the public was permitted to 
comment on the June guidelines.186  These guidelines were mainly published to 
provide a framework in which credit providers could conduct objective assessments of 
consumers.187 It also envisaged reducing reckless lending practices and over-
indebtedness.188 In order to assist credit providers in making a fair pre-agreement 
assessment, the guidelines required a credit provider to reasonably assess the 
consumer’s allocatable189 income and discretionary income,190 to determine whether 
or not the consumer could afford to repay the installments.191     
In September 2013, pursuant to the June guidelines, further guidelines were published 
which aimed to ensure that credit providers conduct a thorough assessment and not 
only have regard for risk of default.192  In order to give effect to section 81 and assist 
credit providers in conducting an assessment to take reasonable steps to assess credit 
worthiness, these guidelines provide calculation standards for credit providers.193  
Moreover, the documents which a consumer submits must be verified such as bank 
statements and/or pay slips, in addition to that the credit provider can also obtain other 
verifiable information in order to validate the consumer’s income.194 In assessing 
discretionary and allocatable income, the credit provider needs to take into account 
                                                          
186 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
187 M Kelly-Louw “The 2014 credit information amnesty regulations: what do they really entail?” (2015) 
48 (1) De Jure 95. 
188 M Kelly-Louw “The 2014 credit information amnesty regulations: what do they really entail?” (2015) 
48 (1) De Jure 95. 
189 Gross income subtract statutory deductions and necessary expenses.  
190 Gross income subtract statutory deductions, necessary expenses and other credit obligations as 
reflected on the consumer’s credit record.  
191 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
192 C van Heerden and S Renke “Perspectives on the South African Responsible Lending Regime and 
the Duty to Conduct Pre-Agreement Assessment as a Responsible Lending Practice” (2015) UPSpace 
available at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/45344/VanHeerden_Perspectives_2015.pdf;sequenc
e=1, accessed on 5 May 2017 at 14.  Letter to CBA.pdf. Compuscan available at 
https://www.compuscan.co.za/downloads/Letter%20to%20CBA.pdf, accessed on 28 November 2017.  
193 C van Heerden and S Renke “Perspectives on the South African Responsible Lending Regime and 
the Duty to Conduct Pre-Agreement Assessment as a Responsible Lending Practice” (2015) UPSpace 
available at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/45344/VanHeerden_Perspectives_2015.pdf;sequenc
e=1, accessed on 5 May 2017 at 14 
194 C van Heerden and S Renke “Perspectives on the South African Responsible Lending Regime and 
the Duty to Conduct Pre-Agreement Assessment as a Responsible Lending Practice” (2015) UPSpace 
available at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/45344/VanHeerden_Perspectives_2015.pdf;sequenc
e=1, accessed on 5 May 2017 at 15. 
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the existing debt obligations that the consumer has on their credit record; this is in line 
with the objective to curtail over-indebtedness.195      
In order to amend the NCA, draft regulations were published in 2014.196 These draft 
regulations provide a minimum threshold for credit providers to comply with when 
undertaking to complete a pre-agreement assessment.197 As per the regulations, it is 
mandatory for a consumer to submit accurate and truthful information for the purpose 
of the credit provider conducting a pre-agreement assessment.198 Furthermore, 
maintenance obligations must be taken into account when calculating allocatable and 
discretionary income.199  
2.3.7 Amendment to the National Credit Act Pertaining to Reckless Lending 
The National Credit Amendment Act No. 19 of 2014 came into operation on 13 March 
2015. This amendment is in line with the joint statement issued by National Treasury 
and BASA, to curtail reckless lending practices and over-indebtedness of 
consumers.200  
As alluded to, prior to the 2014 Amendment, credit providers were given an unlimited 
amount of freedom to determine their own evaluative mechanisms and procedures, 
when conducting a pre-agreement assessment. The legislative provision which 
effectively allowed for this loophole was section 82 (3) of the NCA, which provided that 
if any guidelines were to be published, it would not be binding on the credit provider. 
In the absence of a legal framework to conduct pre-agreement assessments, reckless 
lending practices increased thus leading to significant levels of over-indebtedness.201     
                                                          
195 C van Heerden and S Renke “Perspectives on the South African Responsible Lending Regime and 
the Duty to Conduct Pre-Agreement Assessment as a Responsible Lending Practice” (2015) UPSpace 
available at 
http://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/45344/VanHeerden_Perspectives_2015.pdf;sequenc
e=1, accessed on 5 May 2017 at 16. 
196 “The DTI Publishes Affordability Assessment Regulations for Public Comment” The DTI available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/editmedia.jsp?id=3104, accessed on 19 August 2017.  
197 JW Scholtz…et al Guide to the National Credit Act (2008) 11.5.6. 
198 Regulation 23.  
199 Regulation 23.  
200 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 16 August 2017. 
201 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
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To create conformity within the credit industry, the NCA has been amended to provide 
that a credit provider may still determine its own evaluative mechanisms and 
procedures, provided it results in a fair and objective assessment; however, it may not 
be inconsistent with the Affordability Assessment Guidelines.202 The guidelines are 
criterion for credit providers when conducting pre-agreement assessments.203    
The amendment of the NCA required the Minister to issue the criteria, to enable credit 
providers to conduct pre-agreement assessments in a conformed manner.204 To fulfil 
this statutory obligation, the final Affordability Assessment Guidelines were published. 
This is a positive step on the part of the legislature as there is now conformity in the 
credit industry. Moreover, it is submitted that this would now lead to a better quality of 
pre-agreement assessments and more care would now have to be exercised. The 
justification for this proposition is that there is a legally binding framework which credit 
providers must adhere to.      
With the amendments to the NCA, section 48 was amended to allow for the Minister 
to publish the Affordability Assessment Guidelines. The amendment has deleted 
section 82 (3)205 and (4)206 of the NCA, which were rather problematic sections and 
gave credit providers unlimited freedom. This is significant because it entrenches the 
importance of ensuring conformity in the credit industry with regards to pre-agreement 
assessment models and mechanisms. Furthermore, it curtails the freedom which 
credit providers enjoyed and now seeks to ensure that pre-agreement assessments 
are conducted effectively. As previously alluded to, this is also important from a 
perspective of government policy and the agreement between the BASA and National 
Treasury.   
                                                          
202 Section 82 (1) of the NCA amended by section 24 (a) of the NCA Amendment Act No 19 of 2014.  
203 JM Otto The National Credit Act Explained 3 ed. (2013) 89. The Affordability Assessment Guidelines 
came into operation on 13 September 2015.   
204 Section 48 of NCA. 
205 Subject to subsections (2) (a) and (4), a guideline published by the National Credit Regulator is not 
binding on a credit provider. 
206 If the Tribunal finds that a credit provider has repeatedly failed to meet its 
obligations under section 81, or customarily uses evaluative mechanisms, models or 
procedures that do not result in a fair and objective assessment, the Tribunal, on 30 
application by the National Credit Regulator, may require that credit provider to - 
(a) apply any guidelines published by the National Credit Regulator in terms of subsection (2)(b); or 
(b) apply any alternative guidelines consistent with prevailing industry practice, as determined by the 
Tribunal. 
43 | P a g e  
 
To illustrate the workings of the amendment, in National Credit Regulator v Shoprite 
Investments Ltd,207 Shoprite determined its own evaluative mechanisms and models 
for pre-agreement assessments. The National Consumer Tribunal thus had to 
determine whether it resulted in fair and objective assessments. In assessing 
affordability, Shoprite relied on the existence of marriage; consumers’ spouse’s 
income; and various forms of disability grant.208 In engaging in reckless lending 
practices, Shoprite did not take the requisite care to verify the information pertaining 
to the consumers’ income and took into account irrelevant factors which would 
influence the consumers’ income.209  
The NCR found that this was insufficient and the incorrect approach to adopt. The 
judgement further cautioned against credit providers assuming vital information, the 
NCA requires credit providers to instead verify the source of income.210 This case is 
an example of credit providers not applying their minds correctly to reach an equitable 
outcome.  Thus, Shoprite was fined for reckless lending by the NCR, where it was 
found that the credit provider failed to conduct affordability assessments properly. 
2.3.8 Effectiveness of the NCA Amendment  
To illustrate the effectiveness of the amendments, Moneyweb211 conducted research 
into the retail sector where consumers apply for credit.212 The research illustrated that 
Foschini213 saw a 30% decrease in new store cards. On the other hand, Truworths214 
reported a decrease from 30% to 24%, resulting in a R200 to R250 million estimate in 
the loss of credit sales. This is indicative of the stringent measures now introduced by 
the amendment to the NCA and the Affordability Assessment Guidelines. While South 
Africa has a significant credit market, this decrease should be viewed in a positive light 
                                                          
207 (NCT/32946/2015/140(1)) [2017] ZANCT 98 (5 September 2017). 
208 Para 58.  
209 Para 73.  
210 Para 74.  
211 Moneyweb is an online news service, providing business, financial and investment news.  
212“Credit sales slump: The new normal for fashion retailers” Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/companies-and-deals/credit-sales-slump-the-new-normal-for-
fashion-retailers/, accessed on 18 March 2017.  Moneyweb investigated major fashion retailers who 
sell a significant amount of clothing on credit to customers, after the Affordability Assessment Guidelines 
and 2015 NCA amendment came into effect. Foshini noted a 30% decrease relating to new store cards. 
On the other hand, Truworths noted a decrease from 30% to 24% in new store cards and estimated a 
R200 – 250 million in loss of credit sales.     
213 A large chain retail store. 
214 A large chain retail store.  
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as it indicates the success of the affordability assessment guidelines and NCA 
amendment.  
Apart from the retail sector, the NCR Annual Report for 2015/2016 illustrates that as 
at March 2016: 84.96 million consumer accounts existed at credit bureaus. 65.03 
million (76.5%) of consumers were in good standing, however, 19.92 million (23.5%) 
of consumers had impaired records.215 It appears from the retail sector and NCR data 
that the amendments have resulted in healthy credit records. From these two sets of 
data, it can be inferred that the amendments pertaining to reckless lending has allowed 
for the NCA to achieve its mandate.  
It remains unclear whether the amendments to the NCA have resulted in a reduction 
of EAOs. To ensure that the NCA continuously achieves its mandate to reduce 
reckless lending, the NCR and other stakeholders must ensure that credit providers 
adhere to the credit laws and enforce the necessary penalties and sanctions against 
unscrupulous credit providers.  
2.3.9 Conclusion  
It appears from the above that the legislature has made it more difficult for consumers 
to now obtain credit than was initially the case when the NCA was first promulgated. 
This is because previously the NCA contained shortcomings pertaining to the way pre-
agreement assessments were conducted. It is commendable that the government has 
recognised this issue and sought to rectify it.         
2.4 The Inclusion of External Market Factors in the NCA 
2.4.1 Introduction 
In this context, an external market factor refers to those factors which consumers have 
no control over such as changes in the global economy. These factors will negatively 
impact upon consumers especially when they are in a state of over-indebtedness, as 
repaying debt obligations may seemingly become more difficult.216 External market 
factors are relevant to reckless credit because its inclusion in a pre-agreement 
                                                          
215 “Annual Report 2015/2016” National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR%20Annual%20Report%202015-
16.pdf, accessed on 19 January 2018. 
216 S De Wet… et al “Measuring the effect of the national credit act on indebtedness in South Africa” 
(2015) 8 (1) Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 84. 
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assessment would improve the quality of credit granted and thus, curtail reckless 
lending and prevent over-indebtedness. Moreover, the incorporation of this factor will 
assist in ensuring sufficient income is set aside for a consumer if South Africa faces 
further economic downgrades.217   
2.4.2 South Africa’s Volatile Economy  
South Africa has a volatile economy, which is influenced heavily by political and socio-
economic factors;218 labour unrest in the country also has a negative effect on growth 
and the achievement of fiscal goals.219 Furthermore, external market factors such as 
unemployment, interest rate fluctuations and slow growth of the economy can 
negatively influence the financial affairs of South Africans.220  
It is submitted that external market factors are relevant to South African credit law and 
provision needs to be made for this when a credit provider conducts a pre-agreement 
assessment. This is to ensure that credit providers will be aware of external market 
factors that can have ramifications on a consumer’s salary, thus plunging them further 
into debt and over-indebtedness. Furthermore, it is submitted that if South African 
credit law does not make provision for the inclusion of external market factors into pre-
agreement assessments, consumers may then find themselves in a further state of 
                                                          
217 While economic factors are contributors to reckless credit, it is submitted that once these materialise, 
a consumer will be unable to escape the debt trap. Once a consumer has been embroiled into such a 
debt trap, an EAO becomes inevitable. If one were to consider current events involving South Africa’s 
downgrading to junk status by Standard and Poor (Who We Are S&P Global Ratings 
http://www.spratings.com/en_US/what-we-do. (Accessed: 28 November 2017)) this will have a direct 
bearing on consumers who apply for credit. Now that South Africa has been downgraded to junk status, 
interest rates will increase and thus the cost of credit will be more expensive. Furthermore, this 
economic factor will also contribute to poverty and unemployment. While consumers may already be 
victims of reckless lending, certain sectors of the population may find themselves further embroiled in 
the debt trap as repayments on credit agreements become more difficult. In the current situation, South 
Africans may find themselves in a state of over-indebtedness and easily default; this could well make 
an EAO imminent in the debt collection process. “Infographic: How credit ratings work and how junk 
status will affect you” Business Tech available at     
https://businesstech.co.za/news/banking/168045/infographic-how-credit-ratings-work-and-how-junk-
status-will-affect-you/, accessed on 5 April 2017.  “Why we’re now junk: Read the full S&P statement 
on SA’s credit rating” Eyewitness News available at http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/03/read-the-full-standard-
and-poors-statement-south-africa-credit-rating-junk-status, accessed on 12 May 2017. 
 
218 J H Mostert, S J Steel and F J Mostert “Importance of External Environmental Labour Related Risk 
Factors for Financial Investment Decision-Making” (2002) 5 (3) South African Journal of Economic and 
Management Sciences 649. 
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economies” (2014) Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor 18.  
220 S De Wet… et al “Measuring the effect of the national credit act on indebtedness in South Africa” 
(2015) 8 (1) Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 86. 
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over-indebtedness, thus eventually culminating in an EAO owing to their inability to 
satisfy their debt obligations.       
2.4.3 The Inclusion of External Market Factors into Pre-Agreement Assessments  
In a study surrounding the effectiveness of the NCA in reducing household debt, it was 
observed that, unsecured lending has risen since the advent of the NCA as banks 
have found ways to avoid the seemingly strict laws surrounding the granting of 
credit.221 Although the NCA seeks to curb reckless lending, measures must be in place 
which seek to ensure that consumers are protected from credit providers who wish to 
circumvent the NCA.222   
A criticism of the NCA and measures to prevent over-indebtedness has been that the 
discretionary income component does not consider external market factors, such as 
interest rate fluctuations amongst others.223 This is important because the NCA’s 
drafters probably did not consider the economic reality that South Africans endure. As 
previously alluded to, it is submitted that the junk status may further contribute to over-
indebtedness.  
From an economic perspective, if consumers discretionary income is severely affected 
by the happening of an external economic factor, they will find themselves in a state 
of over-indebtedness as honouring debt obligations will become difficult.224 In terms of 
discretionary income, this will be compromised if a consumer already has a debt 
portfolio indicating over-indebtedness.225 If an external market factor were to occur 
such as recession or in the current state of South African events, downgrading to junk 
status, a consumer’s discretionary income will be affected as a consumer’s ability to 
fulfil their debt obligations will be compromised.226  
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The issue of consumers applying for multiple loans to meet their current debt 
obligations has been contagious in South Africa. 227 Upon examination of the issue 
surrounding consumers who were granted second loans to pay off their initial loan, 
African Bank were found to be engaging in reckless lending.228 This is not only 
problematic from an affordability perspective, however, this also stems from economic 
ramifications.229 When market conditions are favourable, consumers have more 
income available to spend, thus a significant portion goes towards debt.230 When 
consumers are compelled to take out further loans to ensure payment towards the 
initial loan, this may not necessarily be due to a market factor such as the prime rate; 
instead, it is due to their inability to fulfil their initial debt obligations.231     
While statistics are released from the NCR232 depicting the state of the credit market, 
the research conducted by De Wet and co-authors provides a fresh perspective on the 
state of the credit market. While preventing reckless lending is a key purpose of the 
NCA, the authors found that if an external market factor were to occur, consumers 
would find themselves over indebted.233 Apart from academic debate surrounding the 
effectiveness of the NCA, an economic perspective reveals that the NCA has not quite 
fulfilled its purpose.234  It is submitted that the affordability assessments which credit 
                                                          
227“Evidence of reckless lending by African Bank?” Moneyweb available at 
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providers conduct are insufficient are do not quite provide adequate protection against 
reckless lending and subsequent over-indebtedness.235   
2.4.4 Implementation of External Market Factors into Pre-Agreement 
Assessments  
To incorporate external market factors in South African credit law, the legislature must 
make provision for external market factors in an affordability assessment.  
For example: if a low-income earner approaches a credit provider and is employed as 
a miner at a mining company, the credit provider ought to consider the volatility of the 
industry and that in some instances retrenchment is possible. Furthermore, a vital 
consideration is the fact that the industry faces a significant amount of protest action, 
which could negatively impact the salary of the consumer and overall performance. 
Moreover, if a consumer is unemployed, it could invariably lead to poverty thus 
culminating in a reduced monetary flow to the consumer.236  
It is submitted that the external market factors must be objectively assessed and in 
principle, it should be something that must be mandatory when conducting a pre-
agreement assessment. Moreover, this analysis must be conducted by a highly 
competent individual such as an actuarial scientist, including economics, finance and 
legal professionals. Currently, South Africa has encountered a stumbling block in its 
financial market. Rating agency Standard and Poor237 downgraded South Africa to 
junk status.238 It is submitted that this will have a significant effect on consumers who 
are currently over-indebted because consumers who are currently over-indebted due 
to reckless lending practices may find it difficult to furnish their debt obligations.    
When considering which factors are relevant in considering for the affordability 
assessment, government must consult together with the relevant stakeholders such 
as the NCR, credit providers, consumer protection experts, actuaries, lawyers and 
                                                          
235 S Muhanji and K Ojah “Management and Sustainability of External Debt: A Focus on the Emerging 
Economies of Africa” (2011) Review of Development Finance 185.    
236 H Combrink and J Venter “The Influence of Employment and Occupation on a Household's Net 
Equity” (2016) 9 (3) Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 730. 
237 Standard and Poor is a global rating agency, which furnishes credit ratings across a broad spectrum 
of industries such as government, the corporate sector and financial services sector. “Who We Are” 
S&P Global Ratings available at http://www.spratings.com/en_US/what-we-do, accessed on 28 
November 2017. 
238 “Why we’re now junk: Read the full S&P statement on SA’s credit rating” Eyewitness News available 
at http://ewn.co.za/2017/04/03/read-the-full-standard-and-poors-statement-south-africa-credit-rating-
junk-status, accessed on 12 May 2017.  
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economists. This advice would be crucial as the government would have to ensure a 
policy change is successfully implemented. As alluded to, factors such as interest 
rates, property prices and unemployment amongst others should be included in the 
affordability assessments and if further advice is sought from relevant stakeholders 
then it would be possible that more suggestions would be put forward.  
2.4.5 Conclusion 
To enhance the quality of credit granted, the government must make provision for 
binding legislation to be enacted, which would make it mandatory for credit providers 
to include external market factors into pre-agreement assessments. This inclusion will 
assist the consumer credit market in reducing the levels of over-indebtedness due to 
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2.5 Conclusion  
While credit is fundamental to society, it is essential that for a healthy and functioning 
credit market that credit is granted in a responsible manner.  
The Affordability Assessment Guidelines were introduced with an underlying aim to 
reduce reckless lending. There also appears to be a balancing act as indicated in 
Mbatha with the pre-agreement assessment now seemingly more onerous on both 
credit providers and consumers. As the credit market is large in South Africa, the 
amendment to the NCA and Affordability Assessment Guidelines must be adhered to. 
While it has been argued that these mechanisms are not sufficient, policy makers and 
all relevant stakeholders need to make every attempt to introduce the likelihood of 
external economic factors into the pre-agreement assessment. This will ensure that 
legislation is in line with economic realities and that consumer rights are protected from 
events neither they nor credit providers have control over.  As a young democracy, 
South Africa has a volatile political and economic climate; in reducing consumer 
indebtedness, the legislature must intervene and introduce measures to possibly allow 
for a portion of the consumer’s salary to be set aside to include unlikely economic 
events.      
The next chapter will focus on how the current pre-agreement assessments and 
prevalence of reckless lending have an impact on EAOs. The chapter will examine 
whether a link exists between reckless lending and EAOs and explore how the process 
is flawed from the beginning. Furthermore, it will illustrate how the tick box mentality 
to pre-agreement assessments flaws the entire process and seemingly links reckless 
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Chapter 3 
Does A Link Exist Between Reckless Credit and EAOs? 
3.1 Introduction 
Credit is fundamental to any society, it enables consumers to purchase goods and 
access services. However, credit must be granted responsibly and within the 
parameters of South African law and the common law to safeguard the consumer and 
credit provider. Issues arise when unscrupulous credit providers grant credit in a 
reckless manner, thus beginning an ensuing process of debt collection which likely 
culminates in an EAO.239  
South Africa’s socio-economic landscape is indicative of a society encompassing 
poverty, low levels of education and inequality.240 This is due to past inequalities and 
the issues which South Africa faces post-Apartheid.241 In the credit and debt collection 
process, one of the problems prevalent is financial illiteracy and ignorance of the 
law.242 This is not only an issue facing low income earners, it is one which also affects 
consumers of all income brackets.243 It is submitted that this problem is relevant 
because unscrupulous credit providers and those involved in the debt collection 
process take undue advantage of these factors.244   
                                                          
239 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 
1535 (CC) (13 September 2016).  “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee 
orders” – a follow up report” University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017.        
240 JD Triegaardt “Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Policy Considerations in an Emerging 
Democracy” (2006) Paper presented at the annual Association of South African Social Work Education 
Institutions available at http://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-
Us/Publications/Documents/Poverty%20and%20inequality%20in%20South%20Africa%20Policy%20c
onsiderations%20in%20an%20emerging%20democracy.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 2.  
241 JD Triegaardt “Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Policy Considerations in an Emerging 
Democracy” (2006) Paper presented at the annual Association of South African Social Work Education 
Institutions available at http://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-
Us/Publications/Documents/Poverty%20and%20inequality%20in%20South%20Africa%20Policy%20c
onsiderations%20in%20an%20emerging%20democracy.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 2. 
242 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 17. 
243 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 17. 
244 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
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As alluded to in chapter two, when conducting the pre-agreement assessment, credit 
providers do not always take the requisite care to conduct thorough and in-depth 
assessments.245 The University of Pretoria conducted research into the issues 
surrounding EAOs and found that credit facilities were extended to consumers who 
had a history of defaulting.246 Furthermore, when the consumers’ financial situations 
were assessed, the credit should not have been granted.247 The research further found 
that credit providers were interested in consumers who were employed because their 
wage or salary was viewed as a form of security.248     
A controversial factor that is deemed to contribute to reckless credit is a so-called tick 
box approach to granting credit; this means that credit providers do not properly apply 
themselves to the situation of each individual consumer.  It is submitted that this leads 
to a situation where consumers with a job will be extended credit,249 in circumstances 
where the consumer should not have been granted the credit due to over-
indebtedness.250   
                                                          
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
245 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
 
246 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
 
247 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56.  
248 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56.  
249 A consumer who is employed and receives a wage/salary will be deemed favourable to enter into a 
reckless credit agreement as their wage/salary is a form of security upon default when an EAO is 
granted.  
250 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 44. R Rattue. “Ticking the box...down but not yet out.” 
(2016) 3 (1) MoneyMarketing 11. 
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Invariably, default occurs in these reckless credit agreements.251 The credit provider 
will then send a mandatory notice in terms of s129 of the NCA to demand that the 
default be remedied, to prevent further legal proceedings. If the s129 notice is ignored, 
the credit provider can then follow the legal process of issuing summons and then 
applying for judgement.252 Typically, once judgement is obtained a creditor seeks to 
execute it. In most instances involving low incomes consumers in South Africa, the 
method of execution of judgement is the EAO process.253     
This chapter will discuss how reckless credit impacts on the eventual culmination of 
an EAO. It will also seek to investigate the impact of the tick box approach on pre-
agreement assessments. While there are no statistics to support the assertion that a 
link does indeed exist between reckless credit and EAOs, there is anecdotal evidence 
which suggests this link.254        
3.2 The Role of Reckless Lending  
 
 
                                                          
251 The 2015/2016 Annual Report from the National Credit Regulator revealed that fourteen credit 
bureaus which held credit records: there were 23.88 million credit consumers and 9.55 million 
consumers held impaired records.” Annual Report 2015/2016” The National Credit Regulator available 
at https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/Annual%20Reports/NCR%20Annual%20Report%202015-
16.pdf, accessed on 27 September 2017.  
252 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 
1535 (CC) (13 September 2016) at para 12.  
253  “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 10. See University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid 
Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others; Association of Debt 
Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others; Mavava Trading 279 
(Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 
32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 1535 (CC) (13 September 2016) 
at para 36.  
254 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017.  University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 
2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); (2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015).  B Whittle 
“LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13.  
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3.2.1 Introduction  
Most consumers do not have an in depth understanding of the workings of the financial 
sector.255 This is problematic and a factor which unscrupulous credit providers and 
stakeholders involved in the debt collection process take advantage of. In many 
instances, consumers harm their financial welfare and cannot rise above their 
circumstances to generate more wealth when they do not understand what financial 
products entail.256    
3.2.2 Financial Ignorance  
Campbell, in identifying the extent of financial ignorance concludes that there are five 
aspects to it, however, for the purposes of this paper the significant ones are: 
ignorance of financial concepts, contract terms and financial history.257 Ignorance of 
financial concepts is important as this means that consumers do not understand key 
financial terms which are essential to make an informed decision about a financial 
product. 258  
When consumers are given agreements by credit providers or other members of the 
financial industry, they do not necessarily comprehend the contents of the 
agreement.259 At times, pertinent information is not brought to the attention of the 
consumer and hidden in a shrewd manner in tiny font size.  Consumers are also in a 
seemingly weaker position than the other contracting party (such as the credit 
provider) because they do not know how to assess fairness of a contract or negotiate 
terms.260 It is submitted that this leads to poor financial management and renders 
consumers incapable of adequately fulfilling their obligations under the financial 
agreement.261   
                                                          
255 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 3. 
256J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 3. 
257 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 17. 
258 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 17. 
259 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 21. 
260 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 21. 
261 Section 22 of the Consumer Protection Act requires that consumers receive information in plain and 
understandable language. While legislation specifically makes this mandatory, in practice, this has not 
55 | P a g e  
 
Moreover, consumers do not make use of the information that is available around them 
to assess the performance of a financial product.262 Instead, consumers are likely to 
rely on their flawed perception and own experiences to determine the effectiveness of 
a financial product.263 This is an issue which contributes to poor financial decisions as 
consumers use their financial ignorance to determine financial affairs.   
It is submitted that for consumers to be educated about their financial decisions, credit 
providers such as banks and other stakeholders need to embark upon education 
programmes. Such programmes need to educate consumers about key financial terms 
and concepts like interest, reckless credit and which administrative body can be 
approached for dispute resolution. An example of an initiative of this nature is the First 
National Bank (FNB) Be Financially Smart – Education Centre campaign.264  FNB has 
created videos on topics such as how to save, create budgets, insurance policies and 
bank accounts. Drawing from the FNB initiative, it is suggested that other credit 
providers embark on a similar programme where the primary objective is educating 
consumers about financial matters.      
3.2.3 The Impact of Reckless Lending on EAO’s  
It has been argued that while reckless credit is a contentious issue in the EAO process, 
it is not the core problem surrounding EAOs.265 This is because the provisions of the 
NCA are not drafted well and do not provide adequate protection to consumers.266 
These weak provisions of the NCA contribute to reckless lending and over-
indebtedness.267 Furthermore, the NCR, debt collectors and consumers have not been 
proactive in holding unscrupulous credit providers accountable for their reckless 
                                                          
been properly implemented. E de Stadler and L van Zyl “Plain Language Contracts: Challenges and 
Opportunities” (2017) 29 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 96. To be discussed further below in 3.3.4. 
262 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 22. 
263 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 22. 
264 “Your First Steps Become Financially Smart” First National Bank available at 
https://www.fnb.co.za/education/be-financially-smart.html, accessed on 5 September 2017.  
265 B Bentley "Separating the baby and the bath water - garnishee and emoluments attachment orders." 
(2013) 41 De Rebus available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/41.html, accessed 
on 5 September 2017. 
266 B Bentley "Separating the baby and the bath water - garnishee and emoluments attachment orders." 
(2013) 41 De Rebus available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/41.html, accessed 
on 5 September 2017. 
267 B Bentley "Separating the baby and the bath water - garnishee and emoluments attachment orders." 
(2013) 41 De Rebus available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/41.html, accessed 
on 5 September 2017. 
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lending practices.268 This argument is in line with the 2013 University of Pretoria 
research into EAOs where it was found that credit providers were extending credit 
facilities to consumers who could not afford the credit.269     
While it is argued that consumers have not played a proactive role in holding 
unscrupulous credit providers accountable, a fact which must be borne in mind is that 
some consumers do not understand their own financial affairs. Furthermore, 
consumers who do not have the financial means to access lawyers are probably 
unaware of their rights under the NCA or appropriate action which could be taken 
against credit providers. Campbell’s submissions about financial ignorance amongst 
other factors are consistent with Bentley’s submissions because some consumers 
may not be aware that their credit agreements are inherently reckless.      
3.2.4 The Tick Box Approach   
An underlying problem in the pre-agreement assessment process, which is also 
prevalent in the broader financial services industry is the tick box approach to 
compliance. 270  This conduct is defined as “denoting or relating to a procedure or 
process carried out purely to satisfy convention, rules, or regulations.”271 National 
Treasury has expressed its concern about this tick box mentality as credit providers 
were not conducting an in-depth risk analysis of the consumer.272 Instead, it was 
                                                          
268 B Bentley "Separating the baby and the bath water - garnishee and emoluments attachment orders." 
(2013) 41 De Rebus available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2013/41.html, accessed 
on 5 September 2017. 
269 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56.  
270 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 12. 
271“Tick Box” English Oxford Living Dictionaries available at 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/tick_box, accessed on 5 September 2017.   
272 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 12. 
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merely used to satisfy the requirements of legislation, thus leading to detrimental 
consequences relating to the financial affairs of consumers.273    
In order to move away from the tick box approach to compliance, National Treasury 
requires credit providers to conduct an in-depth analysis of the consumer and to 
effectively apply their minds.274 It is preferred that credit providers apply their minds 
rather than the tick box approach because the former will allow for a fair outcome 
which will ultimately serve the economy and consumer well.275 Furthermore, National 
Treasury believes that a tick box approach to compliance could lead to the detrimental 
consequence of excluding certain consumers from accessing financial services.276     
Rattue argues that if the financial services industry became accustomed to the tick 
box approach, it would now have to adopt a “principle based” methodology to satisfy 
compliance requirements.277 This is in line with National’s Treasury’s objective of 
increasing consumer protection and ensuring that a fair and just outcome is 
achieved.278 It is submitted that if credit providers abolish the tick box approach to pre-
agreement assessments, this would lead to the likely outcome of improving the quality 
                                                          
273 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 12. 
 B Elliot “Diversity Leads to Better Financial Results” (2017) 5 HR Future 33. 
274 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 28. 
275 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 28. 
276 “A New Approach to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing” National Treasury 
available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/regulations/FICA/A%20new%20approach%20to%20combat%2
0money%20laundering%20and%20terrorist%20financing.pdf, accessed on 5 September 2017 at 5.  
277 R Rattue. “Ticking the box...down but not yet out.” (2016) 3 (1) MoneyMarketing 11. 
 
278 “Treating Customers Fairly in the Financial Sector: a draft market conduct policy framework for 
South Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/public%20comments/FSR2014/Treating%20Customers%20Fairly%20in%
20the%20Financial%20Sector%20Draft%20MCP%20Framework%20Amended%20Jan2015%20With
Ap6.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 26. 
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of financial services.279 This would also have the result of consumers honouring their 
credit obligations and sustaining a healthy credit market. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that part of the problem lies in the fact that most credit providers are large corporate 
entities. These entities will seek efficient mechanisms and in the process, are likely to 
develop generic criteria to offer credit. This in turn leads to a tick box or generic 
approach which may lead to reckless credit.     
3.2.5 The University of Pretoria’s Research into Reckless Lending and EAOs 
In 2013, the University of Pretoria conducted follow up research into the abuses 
surrounding EAOs.280 The prevalence of reckless lending was highlighted amongst 
consumers who had EAOs issued against their salaries.281 The research team 
examined the credit agreements, in light of information obtained from credit bureaus 
and through conducting affordability assessments.282 On the basis of this and other 
information at hand, reckless lending was uncovered.283 A shocking aspect discovered 
by the research team was that credit providers were extending credit or entering into 
new credit agreements with consumers who could not afford it.284  
This aspect of the research conducted by the University of Pretoria indicates that 
reckless lending and a failure to conduct adequate affordability assessments, does 
have a link with the issuing of an EAO. It is indicative of the fact that if the initial pre-
agreement assessments are not conducted properly, this will plunge the consumer 
                                                          
279 M Janse van Rensburg, P Venter and JW Strydom “The Perceived Contribution of the Practise of 
Strategic Marketing on the Performance of South African Companies” (2012) 9 (1) Journal of 
Contemporary Management 44. 
280 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017. See 3.4 below for further discussion.   
281 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
282 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
283 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
284 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 4 September 2017 at 56. 
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into a further trap of reckless lending and subsequent default, typically leading to an 
EAO. The foundation of the problem commences once credit providers grant reckless 
credit to consumers, thus creating a state of over-indebtedness. Following this, upon 
default by the consumer, the credit provider is then likely to use one of the many debt 
collection mechanisms like an EAO to recover the judgement debt.285 
3.2.6 Case Law Identifying the Link Between Reckless Lending and EAOs         
An example of reckless credit culminating in an EAO is University of Stellenbosch 
Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and 
Others286 where the court examined the credit agreements which the consumers were 
bound to and concluded that there were reckless lending practices prevalent.287  
Furthermore, the pre-agreement assessments were either non-existent or not 
conducted properly.288  The court also remarked that it was not surprising that the 
consumers eventually defaulted as credit was granted recklessly.289  This remark is 
important because it reinforces the notion that when credit is granted in a reckless 
manner and no proper affordability assessment is conducted, default is almost 
inevitable and highly probable.   
The above example illustrates that when credit providers contravene the provisions of 
the NCA pertaining to reckless lending and fail to conduct adequate affordability 
assessments, it is ultimately the consumer who suffers as he/she unsurprisingly 
defaults on the credit agreement. From this point, it is likely that judgement will be 
granted and unfortunately, this profile of consumers is unlikely to have proper legal 
representation. Moreover, it is likely that they do not understand their legal rights and 
the attendant legal and debt collection process. This leads to judgement which in turn 
culminates in an EAO. Up until the Constitutional Court order in the Stellenbosch Law 
Clinic case, EAOs were the most popular debt collection mechanism utilised by 
unscrupulous credit providers.290   
                                                          
285 See 3.4 below for further discussion. 
286 (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); (2015) 36 ILJ 
2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
287 Para 38.  
288 Para 33.  
289 Para 38.  
290  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders in South Africa” The 
National Credit Regulator available at https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-REPORT.pdf, accessed on 7 September 2017.  
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Furthermore, as indicated by the High Court in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, 
default is inevitable when the consumer’s financial position cannot sustain the 
obligations under the credit agreement.      
3.2.7 Conclusion       
It can thus be concluded that reckless credit invariably leads to a state of over-
indebtedness and default on credit agreements. Upon default, it is mandatory that a 
credit provider complies with the NCA before obtaining judgement and executing 
against it.  
3.3 Default and the Section 129 Notice 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Upon default on a credit agreement, the credit provider must issue a notice in terms 
of section 129 of the NCA. As per section 129, the credit provider is required to draw 
the default to the consumer’s attention in writing.291 This includes a proposal to the 
consumer that the credit agreement can be referred to a debt counsellor, alternative 
dispute resolution agent, consumer court or ombud with jurisdiction.292 The NCA 
envisages this to ensure the dispute between credit providers and consumers can be 
resolved, with a further intention to negotiate a payment plan to remedy the default. 
293  
3.3.2 Mandatory Section 129 Notice 
In terms of the NCA, legal proceedings may only be instituted against the consumer if 
the consumer has been in default for at least twenty business days and at least ten 
days have elapsed since the section 129 notice was delivered.294 The credit provider 
can also institute legal proceedings if the consumer has not responded to the notice295 
or responded by rejecting the credit provider’s proposals.296     
                                                          
 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 7 September 2017. 
291 Section 129 (1) (a) of the NCA.  
292 Section 129 (1) (a) of the NCA.  
293 Section 129 (1) (a) of the NCA. 
294 Section 130 (1) (a) of the NCA.  
295 Section 130 (1) (b) (i) of the NCA. 
296 Section 130 (1) (b) (ii) of the NCA. 
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The minority emphasised the importance of the section 129 notice in University of 
Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of 
Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others:297  
• Section 130 (3) and (4) of the NCA requires a court to ensure that there has 
been compliance with section 129, if the matter is brought before a court.298   
• The fact that a court must be satisfied that there was compliance with section 
129 is a jurisdictional fact which must be proved before a court hearing can 
commence.299  
• Furthermore, facts must be placed before court to show that section 129 as 
complied with.300 
Approaching a court is expensive and time consuming and in some instances, a 
consumer may not be able to afford a lawyer to represent his/her legal interests. For 
these reasons, section 129 of the NCA was designed to allow consumers an 
opportunity to access other methods of dispute resolution and solutions to remedy the 
default before approaching a court.301 It is submitted that the intention of the legislature 
in enacting section 129 was to alleviate the burden on the judiciary and allow for 
consumers to reach an agreement with credit providers, without judicial intervention.  
3.3.3 The Issue of Sufficient Information in a Section 129 Notice  
Unfortunately, the NCA is silent about what constitutes sufficient information to enable 
the consumer to respond adequately. 302 In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Maharaj t/a Sanrow Transport,303 it was held that the objectives of section 129 (1) (a) 
of the NCA are: 
                                                          
297 (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 
1535 (CC) (13 September 2016). 
298 Para 25. 
299 Para 25.  
300 Para 25.  
301 M Kelly-Louw “The Default Notice as Required by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2010) 22 (4) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 570. 
302 M Kelly-Louw “The Default Notice as Required by the National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2010) 22 (4) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 572. 
 
303 2010 (5) SA 518 (KZP). Case referred to in M Kelly-Louw “The Default Notice as Required by the 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005” (2010) 22 (4) SA Mercantile Law Journal 573. 
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1) To bring the default to the attention of the consumer   
2) Propose that the consumer makes use of one of the methods to remedy the 
default 
3) Resolve the dispute or ensure that a plan is put forward to bring the payments 
up to date.304     
 
In Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another,305 Cameron 
J considered the meaning of deliver in terms of section 129. For the purposes of 
section 129, delivery does not require the credit provider to prove that the notice came 
to the attention of the consumer, neither does it require proof of delivery to an actual 
address.306 Furthermore, the credit provider must make the necessary averments to 
satisfy the court that on a balance of probabilities the notice reached the consumer.307      
 
In the event that the notice is posted to the consumer, it is not sufficient to show that 
the mail has been dispatched.308 Cameron J was also alive to the fact that with posted 
mail, the risk of non-delivery is high.309 The NCA requires a credit provider to take 
reasonable measures to ensure that the notice is brought to the attention of the 
consumer.310 In this instance, the credit provider must adduce proof to prove that the 
notice was delivered to the correct post office.311  To satisfy this requirement, the credit 
provider must have in his/her possession a post-despatch track and trace report from 
the South African post office.312     
 
A credit provider must allege in its summons or particulars of claim that the notice was 
delivered to the post office.313 Afterwards, the post office would inform the consumer 
                                                          
304 Para 10. 
305 (CCT 98/11) [2012] ZACC 11; 2012 (5) SA 142 (CC); 2012 (8) BCLR 785 (CC) (7 June 2012). Para 
45: “Section 129(1) (a) requires a credit provider, before commencing any legal proceedings to enforce 
a credit agreement, to draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing. It has been described 
as a “gateway” provision, or a “new pre-litigation layer to the enforcement process”. Although section 
129(1)(a) says the credit provider “may” draw the consumer’s default to his or her notice, section 
129(1)(b) (i) precludes the commencement of legal proceedings unless notice is first given. So, in effect, 
the notice is compulsory.” 
306 Para 74.  
307 Para 74.  
308 Para 75.  
309 Para 75.  
310 Para 75.  
311 Para 75.  
312 Para 76.  
313 Para 77.  
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that a registered letter is awaiting collection.314 Once this happens, a credit provider 
can make the necessary averments that the notice reached the consumer and a 
reasonable consumer would ensure that he/she fetches the notice from the post 
office.315 
 
The case of Sebola is important in credit law jurisprudence as it settles the law 
regarding what would constitute delivery to the consumer. This has remained 
controversial for some time. It is submitted that the place of Sebola in South African 
law is pivotal for a credit provider to rebut an allegation that a consumer may make 
that he/she did not receive the section 129 notice. Furthermore, it places an additional 
onus upon credit providers to show that there were efforts to ensure the notice reached 
the consumer.      
 
It is submitted that while a credit provider must take the necessary steps to ensure 
that the section 129 notice is delivered to the consumer, it must also be drafted in a 
manner which enables the consumer to understand its contents. Moreover, the 
language used to draft the notice must be able to communicate to the consumer 
effectively that the default can be remedied. This can be achieved by ensuring that the 
notice is drafted in plain and understandable language.316    
 
African Bank Limited v Additional Magistrate Myambo NO and Others317 held that 
while the NCA does not prescribe a format for the section 129 notice, it must be in 
plain language. Moreover, it must consider the class of persons who the notice is 
addressed to. A challenge surrounding the plain language issue is that lawyers utilise 
legal jargon and words which consumers do not necessarily comprehend, thus 
                                                          
314 Para 77. 
315 Para 77.  
316 Section 63 (1) of the NCA: A consumer has a right to receive any document that is required in terms 
of this Act in an official language that the consumer reads or understands, to the extent that is 
reasonable having regard to usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances and the balance of 
the needs and preferences of the population ordinarily served by the person required to deliver that 
document. Section 64(1) of the NCA: The producer of a document that is required to be delivered to a 
consumer in terms of this Act must provide that document - 
(a) in the prescribed form, if any, for that document; or 
(b) in plain language, if no form has been prescribed for that document. E de Stadler and L van Zyl 
“Plain Language Contracts: Challenges and Opportunities” (2017) 29 (1) SA Mercantile Law Journal 
96. 
317 (34793/2008) [2010] ZAGPPHC 60; 2010 (6) SA 298 (GNP) (9 July 2010). 
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creating impediments for consumers to effectively understand legal documents.318 Du 
Plessis J agreed with the case of BMW Financial Services (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Dr MB 
Mulaudzi Inc319 where it was held that a section 129 notice must not be a mere 
reproduction of the actual section. While agreeing with this aspect of the judgement, 
Du Plessis J commented that the notice must also add important facts and options for 
the consumer to consider.   
 
The section 129 notice is pivotal to the process as it could allow for a consumer to 
remedy the default. From the perspective of the credit provider, this would save legal 
costs because a court would not be approached for an enforcement of the credit 
agreement. On the other hand, the consumer could together with a debt counsellor 
restructure his/her financial affairs in a manner to satisfy debt obligations.    
 
The case of Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (Socio-Economic Rights 
Institute of South Africa as amicus curiae)320 clarified the Sebola judgement as to the 
requirements of what would constitute delivery in terms of the section 129 notice.321 
The Constitutional Court explained that in Sebola, section 129 requires that a credit 
provider bring the default to the attention of the consumer and make him/her aware 
that there are other remedies available, other than resorting to litigation.322 Section 
130 requires that a credit provider fulfil the obligation under section 129 by delivering 
a written notice to the consumer.323   
 
Mhlantla AJ held that section 129 does not require the credit provider to bring the   
notice to the “subjective attention” of the consumer.324 Neither is it a requirement that 
personal service be utilised for it to constitute delivery, as per the NCA.325 When a 
                                                          
318 E de Stadler and L van Zyl “Plain Language Contracts: Challenges and Opportunities” (2017) 29 (1) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 96. 
319 2009 (3) SA 348 (BPD). 
320 2014 (4) BCLR 400 (CC). 
321 The legal position pertaining to section 129 notices required clarification because the case law at 
that point of time was plagued with various conflicting decisions, regarding the correct interpretation of 
section 129. Moreover, the court regarded it imperative to clarify the interpretation of section 129 as the 
credit industry impacted the lives and rights of various stakeholders. Para 17 of Kubyana.  
322 Para 26.  
323 Para 26.  
324 Para 31.  
325 Para 31. 
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section 129 notice has been dispatched to a consumer through post, a credit provider 
must discharge the onus with the following proof: 
1) The notice was sent through registered mail to the correct post office, being the 
address which the consumer chose. Moreover, this assertion can be further 
strengthened through a track and trace report; 
2) The post office did in fact notify the consumer that a registered mail was 
awaiting collection; 
3) The notification must have reached the consumer – an inference can be 
advanced that the post office sent the notification to the consumer’s correct 
address; and 
4) A reasonable consumer would have collected the notice from the post office 
and read it. An inference can be drawn if the above three requirements have 
been complied with. Moreover, a consumer can rebut this if he/she can advance 
reasons to explain why the notice did not come to his/her attention.326         
 
Thereafter, in Nkata v FirstRand Bank Ltd and others,327 there was no compliance with 
section 129 as the bank sent the notices to the incorrect addresses.328 The 
Constitutional Court held that this was irregular as the section 129 notice is a pivotal 
aspect of the debt collection process; furthermore, it was irregular on the grounds that 
the bank commenced litigation without complying with section 129 (1).329 Thus, the 
default judgement which was granted against the judgement debtor had no legal 
effect.330  
 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court held that the warrant of execution and public 
auction were set aside; this included prohibiting the transfer of the property to the third 
party who the bank supposedly sold the property to.331 It is submitted that this can be 
lauded as a victory for consumers who fall prey to predatory practices by banks. 
Moreover, it reaffirms the principle that the credit providers need to take adequate 
                                                          
326 Para 54.  
327 (CCT73/15) [2016] ZACC 12; 2016 (6) BCLR 794 (CC); 2016 (4) SA 257 (CC) (21 April 2016). 
328 Para 4 and 5.  
329 Para 163.  
330 See order of court.  
331 See order of court.  
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steps to deliver the notice and that erroneous addresses would not suffice as an 
excuse.         
 
3.3.4 Plain Language  
The goal of implementing plain language into legal documents can be achieved, if 
South African lawyers change their mindsets pertaining to the way legal documents 
are drafted.332 It is submitted that unscrupulous credit providers and lawyers must not 
use tactics to scare consumers, whereby for example they are threatened with legal 
language and thus misrepresent the law in the process.   It is imperative that lawyers 
understand consumers’ backgrounds and the factors which hinder their abilities to 
make decisions.333 Since South Africa is a diverse country, with a vast array of socio-
economic problems, it would be a costly exercise to translate documents into 
consumers home languages; thus, credit providers should employ the services of 
individuals to explain the documents to consumers in their chosen language.334  
 
In the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, it was not made clear whether the consumers 
understood the contents of the section 129 notice. The High Court335 judgement 
reveals that the consumers were general workers on the lower end of the wage scale, 
who were uneducated and did not possess much knowledge about financial 
matters.336 The applicants in the matter alleged that they did not understand the 
contents of the legal documents, neither were any steps taken to ensure that the 
applicants knew what they were signing.337 While this was alleged in terms of the 
consent to judgement documents, it can be inferred that the likelihood that the 
applicants understood the section 129 notice is unlikely. It is submitted that this was 
                                                          
332 E de Stadler and L van Zyl “Plain Language Contracts: Challenges and Opportunities” (2017) 29 (1) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 102. 
333 E de Stadler and L van Zyl “Plain Language Contracts: Challenges and Opportunities” (2017) 29 (1) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 102. 
334 E de Stadler and L van Zyl “Plain Language Contracts: Challenges and Opportunities” (2017) 29 (1) 
SA Mercantile Law Journal 108. 
335University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015).  
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probably the reason why the consumers did not approach debt counsellors or alternate 
dispute resolution agents.  
 
It is interesting to note Du Plessis J’s remark in Myambo regarding a section 129 notice 
in the context of a consent to judgement. It was held that to ensure the consumer 
made an informed decision when signing the consent to judgement, it is essential that 
a consumer understood the alternatives to approaching court. The consumer must 
also have been given an opportunity to pursue those alternatives.        
 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
Upon default on a credit agreement, it is imperative that credit providers comply with 
section 129 of the NCA. It has been illustrated that a failure to comply with the section 
will lead to the process being set aside. Following the section 129 notice, civil 
procedure dictates a process which must be followed, before a credit provider can 
eventually execute against the judgement in the form of an EAO.  
 
3.4 Debt Collection Process and EAO 
3.4.1 Introduction  
The next step after issuing a section 129 notice is to issue summons against the 
consumer and if he/she does not defend it or respond to it, the credit provider can then 
apply for default judgement.338 As alluded to above, it is unlikely that a vulnerable 
consumer would defend the legal action in court or respond to the summons.  
3.4.2 Procedure to Obtain An EAO  
Once judgement has been granted against the consumer, he/she then becomes 
known as the judgement debtor. Thereafter, the judgement creditor obtains an EAO 
to execute against the judgement.339 An EAO is typically used when the judgement 
debtor does not own any movable or immovable property; it is also used when the 
value of the property is insufficient to satisfy and execute the judgement debt.340  
                                                          
338 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 268. 
339 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 347. 
340 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 347. 
68 | P a g e  
 
EAOs are governed by the MCA, which defines and sets out the procedure to obtain 
one against the judgement debtor. Section 61 of the MCA defines emoluments as: “(i) 
salary, wages or any other form of remuneration; and (ii) any allowances, whether 
expressed in money or not.” As per section 65J of the MCA, an EAO obliges the 
judgement debtor’s employer to attach a certain portion of his/her salary and pay it 
over to the judgment creditor, to satisfy the amount of the judgement debt.341  
Initially,342 section 65J of the MCA entailed two procedures to obtain an EAO. The first 
procedure was:343 
• Obtain written consent of the judgement debtor; or 
• Authorisation from the court  
The second procedure which could be adopted was:344 
• The judgement creditor sends a registered letter to the judgement debtor which 
details the amount and costs of the judgement debt. This includes a warning 
that an EAO will be issued within 10 days of the registered letter being sent, if 
the amount of the judgement debt is not satisfied; and 
• The judgement credit or his/her attorney must file an affidavit with the clerk of 
court detailing the amount of the judgement debt and if any instalments have 
been received.  
3.4.3 Issues Surrounding EAOs 
In 2008, the University of Pretoria conducted research into the prevalence of EAOs in 
South Africa and found that the above-mentioned processes were flawed with 
abuses.345 The research revealed that section 65J of the MCA was problematic. The 
first reason for it being problematic was that a clerk of court had no mechanism to 
verify the authenticity of the signature on the written consent to judgement, how it was 
obtained or the fairness of the instalments.346 The second issue lies in section 65J (2) 
                                                          
341 DE van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 10 
ed. (2017) 441.    
342 The procedures as set out in the MCA, prior to the Constitutional Court’s judgement in the 
Stellenbosch Law Clinic case and subsequent amendments to the MCA. 
343 Section 65J (2) (a) of the MCA.  
344 Section 65J (2) (b) (i) and (ii) of the MCA. 
345  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017. 
346 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
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(b) of the MCA as it does not compel the judgement creditor to disclose the amount of 
the instalment to be deducted.347       
In addition to the above, the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) expressed its concern 
about the abuses prevalent in EAOs.348 It identified four factors which contribute to the 
problems surrounding EAOs:349 
1) Reckless credit; 
2) The way consents to judgement are obtained and the fact that a significant 
portion of a judgement debtor’s salary is attached; 
3) Clerks of court are not equipped with the correct knowledge to identify abuses 
and subsequently refuse to grant EAOs; 
4) The law regulating EAOs is weak as it allows for an EAO to be obtained without 
judicial oversight. 
It is submitted that for the purposes of this dissertation, the first factor identified by the 
LSSA is important. The impact of reckless credit in the EAO process is further 
reinforced by Desai J’s statement in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgement:   
“Moreover the clinic’s uneducated and financially unsophisticated clients were 
frequently the victims of predatory lending practices by credit providers which 
ultimately resulted in them defaulting on their payments. What followed was an 
EAO and a cycle of debt from which there was little, if any, hope of escape.”350 
The concerns expressed by the LSSA are relevant because it highlights the need for 
judicial oversight in the EAO process. Moreover, it relates to the Stellenbosch Law 
Clinic case as both the High Court and Constitutional Court highlighted the problems 
associated to the absence of judicial oversight. It is submitted that these factors 
                                                          
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 7.  
347 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 8.  
348 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. 
349 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. 
 
350 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional 
Services and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 
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identified by the LSSA are a pivotal link to this research as apart from the University 
of Pretoria, it is significant that the legal profession formally acknowledged the inherent 
abuses in the EAO process. Considering the order made by the Constitutional Court 
in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case and subsequent amendments to the MCA, the 
factors identified by LSSA have been acknowledged and subsequently remedied.   
Van Niekerk submits that the fact that an EAO has been issued against the judgement 
debtor is an indication that he/she is over-indebted or a victim of reckless credit.351 
The author even points out that in some instances he/she can be a victim of reckless 
lending and over-indebtedness.352  It is submitted that this may be the case in some 
instances and will not apply to all cases of EAOs, as some credit agreements are not 
necessarily reckless. Furthermore, in some instances, default could occur on a 
legitimate credit agreement due to the changing financial circumstances of the 
consumer, such as he/she may be retrenched or lose their main source of income.   
The University of Pretoria found that the popular way in which an EAO was obtained 
was: following the debtor’s signature of the consent to judgment in terms of sections 
57 and 58 of the MCA, default judgement would then be granted followed by an 
EAO.353 While other debt collection mechanisms exist in the MCA, the research 
produced by the University of Pretoria reveals that an EAO is a favourable mechanism 
as in some instances, a judgement debtor may not have other assets which could be 
attached.354 From the perspective of credit, another reason that an EAO is a 
favourable debt collection mechanism is due to the fact that unscrupulous credit 
providers who engage in unsecured lending deem an EAO to be a form of security.355      
                                                          
351 B van Niekerk “The Use of Emolument Attachment Orders, Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping under 
the Spotlight” (2015) De Rebus 60. 
352 B van Niekerk “The Use of Emolument Attachment Orders, Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping under 
the Spotlight” (2015) De Rebus 60. 
353 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 59.  
354  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 59. 
355  “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 16 September 2017 at 56.  
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Through various case studies, the University of Pretoria found that there were many 
abuses prevalent in the EAO system. These included debtors being unaware of the 
consents to judgement, signatures obtained through duress or misrepresentation, 
fraudulent signatures and documents which were incomplete.356 Judgement creditors 
would forum shop for courts to entertain their applications and these courts would be 
in the incorrect jurisdiction.357 It is submitted that this is contrary to the principles of 
access to redress as the judgment debtor is ultimately disadvantaged; furthermore, 
his/her access to redress and ability to approach a court is compromised.  
In some instances, the amount of the judgement debt would be exorbitant because 
unlawful and unjustified charges were added onto the capital amount.358 The research 
also exposed a lack of communication between employers and judgement creditors: 
in some cases, despite an order being set aside by a court, deductions from the 
judgement debtor’s salary continued.359  The judgement creditors were also found to 
have obtained more than one judgement and in some cases more than one EAO would 
be issued against the judgement debtor for the same debt.360   
The issue of financial ignorance negatively impacts a consumer’s ability to make 
informed decisions about their financial wellbeing.361 Moreover, it was found that due 
to this ignorance, consumers would sign documentation relating to default judgements 
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before it is obtained.362 This finding by the University of Pretoria reinforces the fact that 
consumers need to be exposed to some sort of financial education, which would 
enable them to make decisions which do not compromise their financial wellbeing.  
3.4.4 The Absence of Judicial Oversight in the EAO Process  
While clerks of court play a pivotal role in the debt collection process, some clerks 
were colluding with the judgement creditors as they were accepting bribes to secure 
EAOs.363  The manner in which an EAO would be served on the judgement debtor’s 
employer was found to be flawed as some other individual would serve the document, 
not the sheriff.364 In some instances, the EAO would be faxed to the employer.365 
Clerks of court do not possess the requisite knowledge to evaluate the documentation 
before them and would often grant orders, which were to the detriment of the 
judgement debtor.366    
In the absence of judicial oversight combined with clerks of court not possessing the 
requisite knowledge, the research conducted by the University of Pretoria 
recommended that judicial oversight would be a solution to remedy the abuses in the 
EAO process.367 It is submitted that this recommendation would be appropriate 
because a magistrate, by virtue of his/her legal knowledge would be able to make a 
proper assessment before granting an EAO. Moreover, a magistrate possesses the 
                                                          
362  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 122.  
363“The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 122. 
364  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 123.  
365   “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 123.  
366  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 123. 
367  “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders 
in South Africa” The National Credit Regulator available at 
https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-
REPORT.pdf, accessed on 15 September 2017 at 124.  
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necessary skills to identify flaws in applications such as fraud and reject such 
applications. This problematic position has been remedied by the Constitutional Court 
in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case and subsequent amendments to the MCA.368        
3.4.5 Remedy to the Issues Surrounding EAOs369  
Following the above-mentioned concerns and abuses identified, an application was 
brought before the Western Cape High Court, to declare section 65J of the MCA 
unconstitutional for failure to provide for mandatory judicial oversight.370 The court a 
quo made an order of invalidity which rendered section 65J of the MCA 
unconstitutional for failure to provide for judicial oversight.371  
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court372 elected not to confirm the order of invalidity 
by the court a quo and instead remedied section 65J of the MCA, through the joint 
interpretative mechanism of severance and reading in.373 Thus, Constitutional Court 
order made judicial oversight mandatory in the EAO process.374 It is submitted that 
                                                          
368 To be discussed below and in chapter 4. 
369 This aspect will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  
370 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). To be discussed further in chapter four. 
371 Para 94.  
372 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32. To be discussed further in chapter four. 
373 Para 209. 
374 “65J.   Emoluments attachment orders 
. . . 
(2)     An emoluments attachment order shall not be issued— 
(a)       unless the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing or and the court 
has so authorised after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that an emoluments 
attachment order be issued and that the amount is appropriate, whether on application 
to the court or otherwise, and such authorisation has not been suspended; or 
(b)       unless the judgment creditor or his or her attorney has first — 
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this approach adopted by the majority is far more favourable and appropriate. This is 
because the court correctly interpreted the “or” in section 65J (2) (a) as optional, thus 
judicial oversight was not mandatory prior to the order.375     
The effect of the joint interpretative mechanism of severance and reading in376 utilised 
by the Constitutional Court subsequently remedied section 65J of the MCA. For the 
purposes of this research, it is significant that the Constitutional Court severed the “or” 
from section 65J (2) (a) of the MCA and thus read in “and.” This means that a 
judgement creditor must obtain the consent of the judgement debtor and authorisation 
from the Court before an EAO can be authorised and subsequently issued.  
Following the order from the Constitutional Court, the MCA was amended by the 
Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017.377 The amendment renders judicial oversight 
mandatory, thus giving effect to the order of the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, a 
                                                          
(i)        sent a registered letter to the judgment debtor at his or her last known 
address advising him or her of the amount of the judgment debt and costs as 
yet unpaid and warning him or her that an emoluments attachment order will 
may be issued if the said amount is not paid within ten days of the date on 
which that registered letter was posted; and 
(ii)      filed with the clerk of the court an affidavit or an affirmation by the 
judgment creditor or a certificate by his or her attorney setting forth the amount 
of the judgment debt at the date of the order laying down the specific 
instalments, the costs, if any, which have accumulated since that date, the 
payments received since that date and the balance owing and declaring that 
the provisions of subparagraph (i) have been complied with on the date 
specified therein.; and 
(iii)     been granted an order of court authorising that an emoluments 
attachment order be issued after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that 
the order be issued and that the amount is appropriate.” 
 
375 To be discussed further in chapter 4.  
376 To be discussed further in chapter 4. 
377 To be discussed further in chapter 4.  
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statutory cap of a maximum of 25% has been imposed by the legislature, regarding 
the percentage of a judgement debtor’s salary which can be attached.  
The amendments have also outlined a new process upon which an EAO may be 
obtained. Unlike the previous statutory position and subsequent abuses prevalent in 
the EAO system, a judgment debtor will play a greater role and not face exclusion from 
the process.  The amendments have encapsulated the essence of the Constitutional 
Court order as judicial oversight is now mandatory.378  
3.4.6 The Status of Future EAOs  
According to the research conducted in this paper, there is a link between reckless 
credit and EAOs. As alluded to previously, this link exacerbated due to reckless 
lending practices employed by unscrupulous credit providers. 
Fortunately for consumers and judgement debtors in South Africa, National Treasury 
and BASA acknowledged the inherent flaws in the credit and debt collection industries. 
It is also commendable that the legislature intervened and sought to remedy the issues 
surrounding credit and debt collection. Owing to the NCA amendments, court litigation 
surrounding EAOs and MCA amendments, these would have an impact upon the link 
between reckless credit and EAOs.  
As the legislature has introduced a stringent EAO process with the MCA amendments, 
this could lead to the link this paper has demonstrated being ameliorated, or even 
severed. In line with the NCA amendments and Affordability Assessment Guidelines, 
credit providers have a benchmark which their pre-agreement assessment models and 
mechanisms must conform with. It is submitted that this can remedy the foundation of 
the link, as reckless lending practices inevitably result in default and increase the 
likelihood for an EAO against the judgement debtor. 
While this research did not seek to evaluate whether EAOs should still be utilised 
despite its various flaws, it is submitted that this debt collection mechanism remains 
valuable. While the MCA amendments are deemed a positive step in the debt 
collection industry, the inclusion of mandatory judicial oversight will ameliorate the link 
between reckless credit and EAOs. From this point forward, the process to obtain an 
                                                          
378 To be discussed further in chapter 4.  
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EAO will be a stringent one whereby the inclusion of a magistrate in the process will 
require the procedure to be free of abuses and flaws.   
It is submitted that the link can be broken by the amendments to the law regulating 
reckless lending and EAOs. This can be done through holding unscrupulous credit 
providers and other stakeholders such as attorneys, law enforcement officials amongst 
others accountable for unlawful conduct. Moreover, the link can also be broken if the 
credit industry begins engaging in responsible lending practices. For this to be 
successful, the NCR must play a proactive role in enforcing sanctions against credit 
providers who contravene the NCA. Also, with regards to the amendments to the NCA 
and MCA, these changes to the law must be enforced effectively to break such link. 
3.4.7 Conclusion  
EAOs have been a contentious debt collection mechanism owing to the abuses and 
lack of judicial oversight in the process. With a new debt collection procedure 
introduced, the issues and link between reckless credit and EAOS will break. 
Furthermore, from a consumer protection perspective, consumers and judgement 
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3.5 Conclusion  
Due to the fact that credit plays a fundamental role in the lives of South Africans, credit 
providers need to ensure that there are financial education programmes available to 
educate the public.  
It must be borne in mind that government cannot sustain the responsibility of providing 
financial education programmes due to the pressure already upon it in terms of its 
other mandates. A financial education program will assist South Africans in making 
better financial decisions and may result in fewer defaults and EAOs. 
While there are no concrete statistics to prove that a link exists between reckless 
lending and EAOs, anecdotal evidence proves this link. The Stellenbosch Law Clinic 
judgement and other case law, the University of Pretoria research report and the other 
academic articles referred to further reinforce this link. These sources demonstrate 
that once a consumer becomes a victim of reckless lending, it is inevitable that default 
will occur and that they become trapped in a vicious cycle.     
As illustrated above, there appears to be a dire need of reform and for consumers to 
make informed decisions before signing certain key documents. Furthermore, judicial 
supervision is required in the EAO process to ensure that a just and equitable order is 
made. The next chapter will discuss if judicial supervision is indeed the solution to 
improving the law on EAOs and the manner in which EAOs are currently regulated, in 











78 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 4 
The Current Regulation of Emolument Attachment Orders 
4.1 Introduction  
To illustrate the link between reckless credit and EAOs, it is essential to examine the 
current regulation of EAOs and the mandatory inclusion of judicial oversight into South 
African law. This is to determine the amendments to the law surrounding EAOs by 
virtue of case law and statutory amendments. An EAO obliges an employer to attach 
a certain portion of the judgement debtor’s wages or salary and pay it over to the 
judgement creditor.379 This continues until the total amount of the judgement debt has 
been satisfied.380     
As alluded to in chapter three,381 EAOs have been found to be plagued with various 
abuses and problems.382 These included fraudulently obtained signatures on consent 
to judgements, court officials being inadequately trained to identify irregularities in 
EAO applications and an unreasonable portion of the judgement debtors’ 
salaries/wages being attached.383  
                                                          
379 Section 65J of the MCA.  DE van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ 
Courts in South Africa 10 ed (2017) 442. S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 
347. 
380 Section 65J of the MCA. DE van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ 
Courts in South Africa 10 ed (2017) 443. S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 
347. 
 
381 See 3.4 in chapter 3. 
382 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders in South Africa” The 
National Credit Regulator available at https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-REPORT.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017. “The 
incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” University of 
Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017.  
 
383 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders in South Africa” The 
National Credit Regulator available at https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-REPORT.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017. “The 
incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” University of 
Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017.  
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These apparent flaws brought the EAO process into disrepute as judgement debtors 
were not adequately protected and were victims of reckless lending practices.384 
Moreover, unscrupulous lenders took undue advantage of consumers who had a 
salary/wage which could be attached, as some consumers did not have any other 
movable or immovable property.385 Note that certain institutions recognised these 
flaws and chose not to utilise EAOs against defaulting debtors due to the negative 
impact it has on these debtors.386       
Following the above, the turning point for EAOs occurred in 2015, when a private 
citizen, Wendy Appelbaum became increasingly concerned about the EAOs issued 
against some of her employees.387 She observed that in some instances, more than 
half of their salaries were attached, to satisfy the amount of the judgement debt.388 
Thus, Appelbaum began studying the relevant provisions of the NCA and MCA, as her 
employees were vulnerable consumers who relied heavily on their salaries to sustain 
themselves.389  
                                                          
384 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 55. 
 
 
385 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 56. 
 
 
386 “Joint statement by the Minister of Finance and the chairperson of the Banking Association of South 
Africa” National Treasury available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/comm_media/press/2012/2012110101.pdf, accessed on 11 October 2017 
at 3. 
387 “Wendy Appelbaum throws weight behind ‘garnishee’ case” Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/in-depth/investigations/wendy-appelbaum-throws-weight-behind-
garnishee-cas/, accessed on 26 September 2017.  
 
388“Wendy Appelbaum throws weight behind ‘garnishee’ case” Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/in-depth/investigations/wendy-appelbaum-throws-weight-behind-
garnishee-cas/, accessed on 26 September 2017. 
389“Wendy Appelbaum throws weight behind ‘garnishee’ case” Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/in-depth/investigations/wendy-appelbaum-throws-weight-behind-
garnishee-cas/, accessed on 26 September 2017. 
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Together with the University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic, law firm Webber Wentzel 
and Summit Financial Partners,390 litigation began in the Western Cape High Court.391 
The applicants who were consumers from the lower end of the wage scale fell prey to 
the predatory practices of unscrupulous credit providers.392 In applying to court, the 
applicants sought an order declaring that sections 65J (2) (a), 65J (2) (b) (i) and 65J 
(ii) of the MCA unconstitutional for a failure to provide for judicial oversight.393 
Furthermore, the applicants sought relief for setting aside the EAOs issued against 
them for utilising the incorrect jurisdiction and for them being inherently unlawful.394                 
The High Court  granted the relief which the applicants sought and declared the 
relevant provisions of section 65J of the MCA unconstitutional, for failure to provide 
for judicial oversight.395 As this was an order of invalidity, this required confirmation by 
the Constitutional Court.396 Instead of declaring the relevant provisions of the MCA 
unconstitutional, the Constitutional Court chose to remedy the provisions through a 
joint interpretive mechanism of severance and reading in.397 For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the important aspect from the judgement is the requirement that EAOs 
are now subjected to judicial oversight, by a magistrate.398 The nature of the 
Constitutional Court’s judgement is that it is prospective, as of 13 September 2016.399      
                                                          
390“Wendy Appelbaum throws weight behind ‘garnishee’ case” Moneyweb available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/in-depth/investigations/wendy-appelbaum-throws-weight-behind-
garnishee-cas/, accessed on 26 September 2017. 
391 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
392 Para 10 and 11.   
393 Para 20. 
394 Para 21 and 22. 
395 Para 94.  
396 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic 
and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 
1535 (CC) (13 September 2016). 
397 Para 209.  
398 Para 212: “(2)     An emoluments attachment order shall not be issued— 
(a)       unless the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing or and the court 
has so authorised after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that an emoluments 
attachment order be issued and that the amount is appropriate, whether on application 
to the court or otherwise, and such authorisation has not been suspended” 
 
399 Para 211.  
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This chapter will discuss the High Court400 and Constitutional Court401 judgements, 
including the effect of the order issued by the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, it will 
assess whether judicial oversight is effective when issuing an EAO. This chapter will 
also consider the proposed amendments to the MCA regarding the way EAOs can be 
issued.402  To propose amendments to the law on EAOs, a brief foreign comparative 
analysis will be conducted.         
4.2 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services and Others403  
4.2.1 Introduction – Context on EAOs  
As alluded to above,404 an EAO is a form of execution against a judgement issued 
against the judgement debtor. Once a consumer defaults on a credit agreement, the 
credit provider will issue a mandatory notice in terms of section 129 of the NCA. The 
next step after issuing a section 129 notice is to issue summons against the consumer 
and if he/she does not defend or respond to it, the credit provider can then apply for 
default judgement.405  
Once judgement has been granted against the consumer, he/she then becomes 
known as the judgement debtor. Thereafter, the judgement creditor can obtain an EAO 
to execute against the judgement.406 An EAO is typically used when the judgement 
debtor does not own any movable or immovable property; it is also used when the 
value of the property is insufficient to satisfy and execute the judgement debt.407 An 
EAO is a popular408 debt collection mechanism whereby the judgement debtor’s 
                                                          
400 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
401  University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid 
Clinic and Others; Mavava Trading 279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid 
Clinic and Others (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 
(12) BCLR 1535 (CC) (13 September 2016). 
402 See 4.4 below.  
403 (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); (2015) 36 ILJ 
2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
404 See 4.1 above.  
405 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 268. 
406 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 347. 
407 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 347. 
 
408 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
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employer is obliged to attach an amount of the judgement debtor’s salary or wage and 
pay it to the judgement creditor, until such time that the total amount of the judgement 
debt is fulfilled.409  
Unlike other forms of execution, an EAO is a powerful debt collection mechanism as 
the judgement creditor is guaranteed repayment of the judgement debt, if the 
judgement debtor is employed. Furthermore, provided the judgement debtor remains 
employed, his/her salary serves as a form of security to the judgement creditor due to 
the guarantee and purpose that the judgement debtor’s wage/salary serves to the debt 
collection process.410  
4.2.2 Judgement by Desai J  
In the High Court litigation of the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, there were sixteen 
applicants in the matter and eighteen respondents,411 with one amicus curiae.412 The 
first applicant was the University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic, which observed 
many abuses and instances of fraud in the EAO process.413 The legal aid clinic 
represented indigent clients who were victims of reckless lending practices and caught 
in a vicious debt trap.414 The legal aid clinic sought the necessary relief from the court 
in the public interest, as per section 38 (1) (d) of the Constitution.415   
                                                          
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 56. 
409 S Pete… et al Civil Procedure: A Practical Guide 2 ed (2011) 347. 
 
410 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 56. 
411 The first respondent was the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services, who did not oppose the 
application (para 15).  The fourth to eleventh and thirteenth to sixteenth respondents were credit 
providers, who the applicants entered into credit agreements with (para 16).  Flemix was the 
seventeenth respondent, whose business entailed debt collection services to credit providers (para 17).  
To represent the interests of the debt collection industry, the Association of Debt Recovery Agents were 
the eighteenth respondents (para 18).      
412 The South African Human Rights Commission was admitted as amicus curiae, as their mandate 
pertaining to human rights protection fell within this case (para 19). 
413 Para 10.  
414 Para 11.  
415 Para 13.  
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The second to sixteenth applicants416 were clients of the legal aid clinic, they were 
employed and formed part of individuals on the low end of the wage scale.417 Desai J 
examined the loan agreements which the fourth,418 eighth419 and fourteenth420 
applicants were bound to and concluded that they were victims of reckless lending.421 
It is submitted that this aspect of the judgement pertaining to reckless lending is crucial 
to this research and supports the assertion that there is a link between reckless lending 
and EAOs.    
When an EAO is issued against the judgement debtor’s salary, it is in effect an 
attachment of a form of property.422 Moreover, the fact that the applicants in the matter 
were deemed to be vulnerable as they were low income earners, this attachment had 
a direct bearing on other rights such as: shelter, health and family life.423  Desai J was 
cognisant of the fact that in the case of the applicants, their salaries were important 
because it assisted them in earning a living, however, when an attachment of it 
occurred, it deprived them of their right to dignity as enshrined in section 10 of the 
Constitution.424  Furthermore, a court order or legislation will limit the right to dignity if 
it reduces an individual’s income or creates a hindrance to access social economic 
rights.425        
The applicants’ rights to access courts was severely compromised as the credit 
providers would forum shop for courts,426 which would grant the EAO against the 
judgement debtors.427 The courts which the credit providers approached were far away 
from where the applicants resided and worked, thus making it inaccessible.428 Desai 
J did recognise the fact that it was exceptionally difficult for the applicants to dispute 
                                                          
416 The applicants sought relief in the form of a declaratory order, whereby sections 65J (2) (a), 65J (2) 
(b) (1) and 65J (ii) of the MCA be declared unconstitutional for failure to provide for judicial oversight 
(para 20). Furthermore, the applicants sought an order setting aside the EAOs granted against them, 
because they were issued in the incorrect jurisdictions and were unlawful and invalid (para 21 and 22).  
417 Para 14.  
418 Para 35.  
419 Para 36.  
420 Para 37.  
421 Para 38.  
422 Para 40.   
423 Para 40.  
424 Para 41.  
425 Para 41.  
426 Para 56 and 57: the credit providers were forum shopping for courts to suit themselves, however, in 
the process this amounted to an infringement of the applicants’ rights to access courts.    
427 Para 51.  
428 Para 51. 
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or challenge the EAOs, considering the fact that the courts were inaccessible to 
them.429   
In deciding whether judicial oversight would be mandatory to the EAO process, Desai 
J relied on and interpreted certain key international law instruments. South Africa is 
not party to the International Labour Organisations’ Protection of Wages 
Convention,430 however, Desai J was of the opinion that by virtue of the fact that many 
States have ratified it, it has achieved the status of customary law.431 This instrument 
requires that when wages are to be attached, this must be done in a manner whereby 
the judiciary or another body supervises such attachment.432  Moreover, such 
attachment must be within the States’ laws and must allow for the judgement debtors 
to be able to provide for themselves and their families.433  Furthermore, the debtor 
must be protected and allowed to defend such action when an attachment is made.434      
Apart from the above instrument, Desai J relied on two other international law 
instruments.435 These are not binding, however, were of persuasive value in settling 
the judicial oversight debacle.436 International law demands that States take 
precautionary steps to protect its citizens from abuses that they may face from 
business enterprises. Desai J held that this duty as entailed in international law should 
be used to interpret the provisions of the MCA.437  Moreover, the system of obtaining 
EAOs as it was at the time of the High Court judgement failed to comply with the 
mentioned international law instruments.438      
                                                          
429 Para 53.  
430 Article 10: 
“1. Wages may be attached or assigned only in a manner and within limits prescribed by national laws 
or regulations. 
2. Wages shall be protected against attachment or assignment to the extent deemed necessary for the 
maintenance of the worker and his family.” This Convention seeks to ensure that workers are not 
exploited by employers, regarding remuneration. Under the Convention, workers must receive fair and 
adequate wages and not be subjected to unfair labour practices. International Labour Office Protection 
of Wages: Standards and Safeguards Relating to the Payment of Labour Remuneration (2003) 3.  
431 Para 67.  
432 Para 69. 
433 Para 68. 
434 Para 70.  
435 Para 71 – 73: the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Council Resolution 26/22 of 15 July 2014.  
436 Para 73.  
437 Para 74. 
438 Para 75.  
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Apart from the international law obligations, Desai J examined the Constitutional law 
jurisprudence surrounding judicial oversight such as Chief Lesapo v The North West 
Agricultural Bank and Another, Jaftha v Schoeman and Others and Gundwana v Steko 
Development CC and Others.439 These cases were significant to the EAO process as 
it is a form of execution against the judgement debtor440 and all three cases highlight 
the need for judicial oversight, in execution matters.441  Moreover, when faced with 
vulnerable debtors, there is a likelihood that they could fall prey to unscrupulous 
practices of creditors. Thus, Desai J held that the arguments and reasoning formulated 
in the above three cases applied to the EAO process.442    
In this matter, the respondents tried to argue that as section 65J of the MCA stood at 
the time of litigation, it was constitutionally valid as the judgement debtor could 
approach the court to vary or set aside an EAO.443 Desai J rejected this contention as 
the Constitutional Court jurisprudence indicates that such contention is 
unacceptable.444 Applying the reasoning of Gundwana, Desai J held that judicial 
oversight in the EAO process must be mandatory, it is insufficient that a clerk of court 
make such a determination.445 Furthermore, judicial oversight must be exercised at 
the time of execution and not at a time when the respondents argued it should be 
exercised.446       
4.2.3 Conclusion  
Desai J ordered that the EAOs issued against the second to sixteenth respondents 
were set aside, unlawful and invalid.447 It was declared that:448 
1) “The words “the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing” in section 
65J(2)(a) of the Magistrates’ Act 32 of 1944 (“the Magistrates’ Court Act”) and; 
                                                          
439 Para 76. Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another (CCT23/99) [1999] ZACC 16; 
2000 (1) SA 409; 1999 (12) BCLR 1420 (16 November 1999). Jaftha v Schoeman and Others, Van 
Rooyen v Stoltz and Others (CCT74/03) [2004] ZACC 25; 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 78 
(CC) (8 October 2004). Gundwana v Steko Development CC and Others (CCT 44/10) [2011] ZACC 14; 
2011 (3) SA 608 (CC); 2011 (8) BCLR 792 (CC) (11 April 2011). 
440 Para 80.  
441 Para 77 – 79.  
442 Para 81.  
443 Para 82.  
444 Para 83.   
445 Para 84.  
446 Para 84.  
447 Para 94.  
448 Para 94. 
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2) Section 65J(2)(b)(i) and section 65J(2)(b)(ii) of the Magistrates’ Court Act, are 
inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 (“the 
Constitution”) and invalid to the extent that they fail to provide for judicial 
oversight over the issuing of an emolument attachment order against a 
judgment debtor.”449  
As Desai J made an order of invalidity regarding the above-mentioned sections of the 
MCA, the judgement as at 8 July 2015 was of no force and effect.450 As per section 
172 (2) of the Constitution, the decision was of no force and effect in law because it 
required the Constitutional Court to confirm the High Court’s order of invalidity.451  
It is submitted that this judgement is significant as it highlighted the unscrupulous 
methods which credit providers were engaging in when granting credit and when 
seeking to recover debt.452 Shortly after this judgement, the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development announced that it was in the process of preparing the 





                                                          
449 After Desai J’s judgement was handed down, auditing firm PriceWaterHouse Coopers (PWC) 
commented on the judgement in light of section 179 (1) of the Tax Administration Act. The comment 
concerned the fact that section 179 (1) does not allow for judicial oversight as it empowers SARS to 
issue an EAO against a taxpayer, without approaching the court for authorisation. Considering Desai 
J’s judgement, the comment by the auditing firm was that this provision could be unconstitutional for 
failure to provide for judicial oversight. It is submitted that due to Desai J’s judgement and the 
subsequent order by the Constitutional Court, this section may face a constitutional challenge for 
infringing on a taxpayer’s section 34 constitutional rights. “Invalidity of Emolument Attachment Orders: 
comment” (2015) 359 Tax Breaks Newsletter 1 – 3.     
450 M De Jong “University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services (South African Human Rights Commission as amicus curiae) – Implications for the issuing of 
emoluments attachment order in maintenance matters?” (2016) 79 (2) Tydskrif vir hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 266. 
451 M De Jong “University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic v Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services (South African Human Rights Commission as amicus curiae) – Implications for the issuing of 
emoluments attachment order in maintenance matters?” (2016) 79 (2) Tydskrif vir hedendaagse 
Romeins-Hollandse Reg 266. 
 
452 M Thebe “Debt Collection System to be Changed” (2015) De Rebus 122. 
453 M Thebe “Debt Collection System to be Changed” (2015) De Rebus 122. 
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 4.3 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services and Others; Association of Debt Recovery Agents 
NPC v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others; Mavava Trading 
279 (Pty) Ltd and Others v University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and 
Others454  
4.3.1 Introduction  
The issue before the Constitutional Court, which is of relevance to this paper concerns 
whether the order of invalidity by Desai J of the MCA should be confirmed.455 The 
purpose of including the Constitutional Court judgement in the paper is primarily to 
examine its order and its effect, which becomes important in the amendments 
discussed in 4.4 below.  
4.3.2 The Minority Judgement by Jafta J (Para 1 to 127)456 
Jafta J sought to investigate whether the sections contained in the order of invalidity 
fail to provide for judicial oversight when an EAO is issued; if it fails to provide for 
judicial oversight, an investigation must be conducted to determine if this limits the 
rights to access courts as per section 34 of the Constitution.457 Jafta J held that the 
High Court erred in that Desai J failed to interpret section 65J of the MCA, and merely 
declared section 65J (2) invalid for failure to provide judicial oversight.458  
In interpreting section 65J of the MCA, it needed to be made clear whether the 
provision permitted a clerk of court or a court to grant an EAO.459 If the provision 
permits a court and not a clerk, then such provision would not be invalid.460 Jafta J 
relied on two cases461 where the Constitutional Court held that when determining an 
                                                          
454 (CCT127/15) [2016] ZACC 32; 2016 (6) SA 596 (CC); (2016) 37 ILJ 2730 (CC); 2016 (12) BCLR 
1535 (CC) (13 September 2016). 
455 Para 68.  
456 The purpose of discussing the minority judgement in this aspect of the paper is to provide an 
overview of the minority’s judgement. While the paper does not support the views of the minority, it will 
be discussed to ensure completeness.  
457 Para 71.  
458 Para 72.  
459 Para 75. 
460 Para 75. 
461 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) 
Ltd and Others In re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others (CCT1/00) 
[2000] ZACC 12; 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 ; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) (25 August 2000). De Beer NO v North-
Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council and Others (Umhlatuzana Civic Association 
Intervening) (CCT 59/00) [2001] ZACC 9; 2002 (1) SA 429 (CC); 2001 (11) BCLR 1109 (26 September 
2001). 
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issue of constitutional invalidity pertaining to two conflicting approaches, the correct 
approach to interpretation would be to choose the construction which places the 
provision within the ambit of the Constitution.462     
The text and wording of section 65J indicates that the requirements of section 65J (2) 
must be complied with for an EAO to be issued.463 The wording of section 65J (1) “a 
judgement creditor may cause an order to be issued from the court of the district” is 
relevant for interpretation purposes to determine if it is the court or clerk of court who 
has the authority to issue the EAO.464 Jafta J observed that the section merely refers 
to the clerk of court once in section 65J (3).465    
The minority deemed it appropriate to make a declaration in the circumstances, 
considering the wide spread abuses surrounding EAOs and supposed erroneous 
interpretation: an EAO may only be issued by a court; as this will protect vulnerable 
debtors from being left in financial distress.466 This must be done after a court has 
taken into account the factors as per section 65D (4)467 of the MCA.468 An EAO will be 
valid if the judgement debtor has sufficient residual income and such order will only 
apply when the judgement debtor has an excess of funds for their own and their 
dependants’ upkeep.469 Based on the above reasoning, Jafta J held that the High 
Court’s order of invalidity could not be confirmed as section 65J provided for judicial 
oversight.470  
It is submitted that Jafta J has adopted a narrow approach to interpreting section 65J 
of the MCA. Moreover, while the guidance provided from Hyundai and De Beer require 
a court to choose the interpretation which is within the ambit of the Constitution, Jafta 
J’s interpretation appears to be narrow. In as much as Jafta J commented on the fact 
that by virtue of the fact that a section may be misconstrued in reality, it does not 
change its meaning, the minority judgement has effectively ignored the realities and 
                                                          
462 Para 76.  
463 Para 85.  
464 Para 86. 
465 Para 87. 
466 Para 93.  
467 Such as: the nature of the debtor’s income, amount necessary for the judgement debtor to support 
themselves and their dependants. 
468 Para 90. 
469 Para 90. 
470 Para 94.  
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abuses surrounding section 65J of the MCA. While Jafta J did make a declaration to 
the effect that only a court may issue an EAO, it is submitted that this was insufficient.  
The minority’s decision to not confirm the order of invalidity was incorrect and its 
overall approach flawed. Jafta J did not effectively consider the fact that section 65J 
(2) (a) by virtue of the “or” implies that a judgement creditor has the option of 
approaching the court. Furthermore, Jafta J failed to consider that this interpretation 
does not make judicial oversight mandatory, it makes it optional. The more suitable 
method would have been for Jafta J to investigate the “or” as it is problematic from an 
interpretation perspective. The minority chose to justify the argument that section 65J 
of the MCA allows for judicial oversight by interpreting other sections of the MCA, 
which have no bearing on EAOs. It thus had the effect of complicating the matter at 
hand. Moreover, had the minority judgement been adopted by the majority, it would 
have led to an onerous task for magistrates faced with EAOs.   
While criticising Cameron J’s approach for not differentiating between execution of 
movable and immovable property, Jafta J probably lost sight of the fact that both forms 
of execution have equal ramifications. Moreover, an EAO is a powerful debt collection 
mechanism and the minority failed to realise that unscrupulous credit providers and 
other stakeholders wilfully take undue advantage of a wage or salary. Thus, it is 
submitted that judgement debtors require equal protection in both execution against 
movable and immovable property.             
4.3.3 Cameron J’s Majority Judgement (Para 128 to 161)471 
Cameron J agreed with the High Court that the EAO process was flawed for failure to 
provide for judicial oversight and correctly declared it invalid.472 The second judgement 
is correct unlike the minority, in holding that executions against property form part of 
the judicial process thus it warrants judicial oversight.473 Cameron J specifically 
identified and applied the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on execution, although 
in the context of immovable property such as Chief Lesapo, Jaftha and Gundwana.474        
                                                          
471 Cameron J concurred with the judgement and order of Zondo J, however, elected to write separately 
(para 128).  
472 Para 129. 
473 Para 129.  
474 Para 129. These cases dictate that judicial oversight cannot be removed from the execution process. 
Cameron J’s reasoning indicates that it is inextricably linked to the section 34 constitutional right which 
entrenches the right of access to courts.  
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Cameron J acknowledged that due to the inherent nature of EAOs, it warrants the 
need for judicial oversight as it is ultimately a substantive decision.475 Through the 
attachment of the judgement debtor’s salary/wage, the court dictates the repayment 
of the debt.476 Jaftha and Gundwana are relevant as the judgement debtor’s seek to 
lose a part of their property in the form of their income, through an EAO.477 The 
absence of judicial oversight in the EAO process infringes a judgement debtor’s right 
to access of courts, as enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution.478        
Section 65J (2) (a) of the MCA by virtue of the “or” in the provision is indicative of 
alternatives and that an EAO can be issued if either aspect is triggered.479 The “or” 
allows for a judgement creditor to obtain an EAO either through obtaining the 
judgement debtor’s consent or through court authorisation.480 To rebut Jafta J’s 
minority judgement, Cameron J counteracted it by attacking the wording of the 
provision; if a court were at all times empowered with issuing an EAO, the alternative 
instance in section 65J (2) (a) would seemingly be redundant.481 Moreover, section 
65J (1) indicates that an EAO is issued from the court, not by the court: this appears 
problematic and Cameron J held that it is indicative of execution without judicial 
oversight.482  
Section 65J (5) states the words “as if it were a court judgement” which Cameron J 
examined in light of section 65J (2) and concluded that there is no provision for judicial 
oversight.483 Cameron J acknowledged that while legislation must be interpreted to 
bring it in line with its true meaning, the Court cannot overstep its boundaries and the 
separation of powers doctrine by widening the interpretation of a provision.484 On a 
literal interpretation, section 65J (2) excludes judicial oversight.485 According to 
Cameron J, the provision defies the Constitution and in such a situation, the 
appropriate remedy would be to strike it down as it is offensive.486    
                                                          
475 Para 130. 
476 Para 130. 
477 Para 132. 
478 Para 133. 
479 Para 145. 
480 Para 145. 
481 Para 145. 
482 Para 145. 
483 Para 146. 
484 Para 147.  
485 Para 148. 
486 Para 149.  
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Cameron J held that the High Court interpreted section 65J correctly as section 65J 
(1) is dependent on the circumstances in section 65J (2).487 Both instances in section 
65J (2) are constitutionally invalid as judicial oversight is not mandatory, thus section 
65J (1) would be inoperative as it is subjected to section 65J (2).488 Moreover, as 
section 36 of the Constitution allows for a justifiable limitation of a right enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights, Cameron J held that there is no justified basis upon which the section 
34 right can be limited.489 Based on this, Cameron J confirmed the substance of the 
order which the High Court issued despite the third judgement adopting a different 
remedy.490        
It is submitted that Cameron J’s judgement adopts a broad approach to the issue of 
judicial oversight.491 Unlike the first judgement, which criticized this one for not making 
a distinction between execution of movable and immovable property, Cameron J was 
correct in applying the principles from Chief Lesapo, Jaftha and Gundwana and 
amplifying its effect to apply to cases of EAOs. It is praiseworthy that Cameron J 
developed the law on executions from the broad range of constitutional jurisprudence 
to include EAOs. This all-encompassing approach is welcomed as it will seek to now 
protect vulnerable judgement debtors, who find themselves helpless and victims of 
excessive and unlawful EAOs. 
Cameron J investigated and interpreted section 65J (2) of the MCA and correctly 
identified the “or” as providing alternatives to a judgment creditor, which is an aspect 
of the MCA that has allowed for abuse by virtue of its wording. It is submitted that for 
execution against any property, judicial oversight must be mandatory. The second 
judgement has resulted in a triumph for judgement debtors to fully realise and exercise 
their section 34 constitutional rights. After examining Cameron J’s judgement, it 
appears as if the minority lost sight of the fact, through erroneous interpretation that 
section 65J of the MCA does not make judicial oversight mandatory and instead 
infringes on a judgement debtor’s ability to approach a court.       
                                                          
487 Para 153. 
488 Para 153. 
489 Para 153.  
490 Para 155.  
491 R Brits “The National Credit Act and the Bill of Rights: Towards a constitutional view of consumer 
credit regulation” (2017) 3 Journal of South African Law 476. 
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In light of the fact that South Africa entered into a constitutional dispensation following 
the conclusion of Apartheid, legislation ought to be on par with the Constitution. The 
MCA is a piece of legislation which has been in existence before the constitutional era, 
thus it remains important for judges to ensure legislation is compliant with the 
Constitution. Cameron J provided a favourable interpretation of the constitutional 
rights such as: right of access to courts, right to dignity coupled with socio-economic 
rights and the right to property to substantiate the need for judicial oversight in the 
EAO process.  
4.3.4 Zondo J’s Majority Judgement (Para 162 to 213) 
Zondo J concurred with Cameron J’s judgement, however, wrote separately to provide 
another perspective on the issues at hand.492  This aspect of the judgment is important 
to illustrate the order and its effect on EAOs.  
Upon interpreting section 65J (1) (a), Zondo J held that while it seems convenient to 
interpret it to mean a court is empowered to issue EAOs, this is not the case.493 The 
words “a judgement creditor may cause an emoluments attachment order to be issued 
from the court” essentially means that it is the judgement creditor, in their capacity as 
litigant who instructs the court to make or grant an EAO; Zondo J held that this is 
inconsistent with the Constitution.494          
Zondo J rejected the contention that it is the court which issues an EAO495 as this 
ignores the role that a court plays in the EAO process.496 In light of the MCA, the 
court’s role is to authorise the issuing of an EAO and another official is thus 
empowered to actually issue it.497 In the event that a court does not authorise the 
issuing of an EAO, it will have no role to play in the issuing.498 Zondo J found it 
necessary to consider the meaning of “issued” in the context of section 65J (1) (a) to 
determine if this is an administrative or judicial function.499 Thus, Zondo J held that 
“issue” in section 65J (1) (a) is the equivalent to “the plaintiff may cause a summons 
                                                          
492 Para 162.  
493 Para 172. 
494 Para 172. 
495 Para 176. 
496 Para 177.  
497 Para 177.  
498 Para 177.  
499 Para 178. 
93 | P a g e  
 
to be issued.” 500 In this instance, there is no inclusion or involvement of a judicial 
officer like a magistrate.501 Moreover, section 65J (3) which outlines the steps to obtain 
an EAO does not make provision for judicial oversight.502     
When examining section 65J (2), Zondo J like Cameron J correctly concluded that 
under paragraph (a), the consent or court authorisation aspects are alternatives.503 
Section 65J (2) (a) thus means that an EAO can be issued if the judgement debtor 
either consents in writing or the court authorises it.504 A problem with the first 
alternative is that if a judgement debtor consents, there is no judicial oversight unlike 
the second alternative.505 Based on this alternative scenario, Zondo J held that the 
contention that this provision allows for judicial oversight cannot be sustained as it also 
allows for an alternative, whereby judicial oversight is not required. 506        
Zondo J also identified section 65J (2) (b) (i)507 as having some sort of problematic 
wording.508 By virtue of this wording, it is interpreted to mean that the judgement 
creditor has the power to elect whether the EAO is to be issued or not.509 Furthermore, 
Zondo J indicated that this provision does not sustain the contention that a court issues 
an EAO; this is due to the fact that it gives a judgement debtor a warning that the EAO 
“will” be issued and does not utilise the word “may.”510    
Considering what has been discussed above, Zondo J held that section 65J of the 
MCA was inconsistent with section 34 of the Constitution and thus constitutionally 
invalid.511 To remedy the section, Zondo J opted to utilise the interpretative 
mechanisms of reading in512 and severance.513     
                                                          
500 Para 184. 
501 Para 184.  
502 Para 185. 
503 Para 194. 
504 Para 194.   
505 Para 195.  
506 Para 196. 
507 “An emoluments order will be issued if the said amount is not paid within ten days of the date on 
which the registered letter was posted.” 
508 Para 197.  
509 Para 198.  
510 Para 197.  
511 Para 203.  
512 Para 206.  
513 Para 209. 
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Zondo J used the joint interpretative mechanism of reading in and severance as the 
former would remedy a constitutional defect by virtue of a legislative omission.514 To 
put this into practical application, Zondo J remedied section 65J (2) (a) by severing the 
“or” and in its place reading in “and.”515 This would ensure that judicial oversight is 
mandatory, even if a judgement debtor has consented in writing.516 Zondo J ordered 
the reading in of the words “after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that an 
emoluments attachment order be issued and that the amount is appropriate” after 
“authorised” in section 65J (2) (a).517 This was important to Zondo J because it would 
ensure that a court considers whether the EAO is just and equitable in the 
circumstances and such amount is appropriate, before an EAO is issued.518        
Section 65J (2) (b) also required a remedy. Zondo J severed the word “will” in section 
65J (2) (b) (i) and ordered the reading in of the word “may” to replace it.519 This was 
to ensure that the issuing of an EAO will not be mandatory and is dependent on the 
court’s discretion.520 The full stop was severed at the end of section 65J (2) (b) (ii) and 
Zondo J ordered the reading in of a colon and the word “and.”521 Furthermore, Zondo 
                                                          
514 Para 206.  
515 Para 209. 
516 Para 209. 
517 Para 209. 
518 Para 209. 
519 Para 210. 
520 Para 210. 
521 Para 210.  
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J ordered the reading in of a new section being section 65J (2) (b) (iii).522 Zondo J 
concurred with Cameron J’s reasoning that the order523 be prospective in nature.524  
The third judgement effectively pointed out discrepancies in the MCA, which 
contradicted the contention that an EAO is a court order. Moreover, Zondo J 
demonstrated the redundancy of the other subsection in section 65J which rebutted 
the argument that the provision does allow for judicial oversight.  
It is interesting to note the manner in which Zondo J interpreted and resolved the issue 
of who is empowered to issue the EAO. Moreover, Zondo J correctly interpreted it in 
light of practical realities whereby a clerk of court is given significant power in the EAO 
process. The fact that section 65J (2) (a) by virtue of the “or” gave judgement creditors 
carte blanche to determine which alternative to adopt, gave rise to many abuses and 
the subsequent argument that judicial oversight is non-existent and not mandatory. 
                                                          
522 “been granted an order of court authorising than an emoluments attachment order be issued after 
satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that the order be issued and that the amount is appropriate” 
in para 210.   
523 Para 212: “65J.   Emoluments attachment orders 
. . . 
(2)     An emoluments attachment order shall not be issued— 
(a)       unless the judgment debtor has consented thereto in writing or and the court 
has so authorised after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that an emoluments 
attachment order be issued and that the amount is appropriate, whether on application 
to the court or otherwise, and such authorisation has not been suspended; or 
(b)       unless the judgment creditor or his or her attorney has first— 
(i)        sent a registered letter to the judgment debtor at his or her last known 
address advising him or her of the amount of the judgment debt and costs as 
yet unpaid and warning him or her that an emoluments attachment order will 
may be issued if the said amount is not paid within ten days of the date on 
which that registered letter was posted; and 
(ii)      filed with the clerk of the court an affidavit or an affirmation by the 
judgment creditor or a certificate by his or her attorney setting forth the amount 
of the judgment debt at the date of the order laying down the specific 
instalments, the costs, if any, which have accumulated since that date, the 
payments received since that date and the balance owing and declaring that 
the provisions of subparagraph (i) have been complied with on the date 
specified therein.; and 
(iii)     been granted an order of court authorising that an emoluments 
attachment order be issued after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that 
the order be issued and that the amount is appropriate.” 
 
524 Para 211. 
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Through the joint interpretative mechanism, the law has now been remedied, to allow 
for judicial oversight and to ensure that judgement debtors can now fully realise their 
section 34 constitutional rights.525       
4.3.5 Effect of the Order        
The effect of the Constitutional Court’s order is that a court must authorise the issuing 
of an EAO, even if the judgement debtor has consented in writing.526 It is no longer 
permissible for an EAO to be issued without the authorisation of the court.527  
Furthermore, the court must be satisfied that it is just and equitable in the 
circumstances and that such amount to be attached is appropriate.  
The severance of “will” and reading in of “may” appears to relax section 65J (2) (b) (i) 
as an EAO will be issued at the discretion of the court. The inclusion of section 65J (2) 
(b) (iii) as a mandatory provision to be read into the MCA is significant as it is clear 
that court authorisation must also be sought under section 65J (2) (b). As the order is 
prospective, it applies to EAOs from 13 September 2016. 
Following the handing down of the Constitutional Court’s order, Lisa Steyn from the 
Mail and Guardian interviewed a Sheriff, whose name and jurisdiction was withheld 
due to permission not being granted by the Board of Sheriffs.528 The sheriff in question 
revealed that the applications for EAOs had reduced drastically, as much as by 70% 
due to the fact that judicial oversight was mandatory.529  As this is only one case study 
                                                          
525 As Zondo J utilised two interpretive mechanism to remedy the constitutional defects, both must be 
commented upon. Reading in is utilised to remedy a statutory defect, to keep the provision intact in a 
manner which is compliant with the Constitution. With this statutory mechanism, words are read into 
the provision to bring it in line with the Constitution and it does give the provision a new meaning. On 
the other hand, severance is an interpretation mechanism utilised by the court to sever the aspects of 
the provision which are unconstitutional. Since the court utilised the mechanism of reading in, the effect 
of the order by Zondo J must be read into the MCA to give effect to the order. A Singh The Impact of 
the Constitution on Transforming the Process of Statutory Interpretation in South Africa (LLD thesis, 
University of KwaZulu Natal, 2014) 81 – 82.  
526 DE van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 10 
ed (2017) 444. 
527 DE van Loggerenberg Jones and Buckle: Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South Africa 10 
ed (2017) 444. 
528 “High noon as sheriffs do the dirty debtor work” Mail and Guardian 3 November 2016 available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-03-00-high-noon-as-sheriffs-do-the-dirty-debtor-work, accessed on 7 
October 2017.  
 
529 “High noon as sheriffs do the dirty debtor work” Mail and Guardian 3 November 2016 available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-03-00-high-noon-as-sheriffs-do-the-dirty-debtor-work, accessed on 7 
October 2017. 
 
97 | P a g e  
 
referred to and one particular jurisdiction, it is submitted that it appears as if the 
judgment and order, which was prospective in application has seemingly been 
adhered to.530 There is not enough evidence or statistics to suggest that this is 
definitely the case, however, anecdotal reports suggests that the order by the 
Constitutional Court is working. It is submitted that this is due to the fact that a court is 
required to authorise the issuing of an EAO, to critically evaluate the order itself and 
the amount sought to be attached. 
4.3.6 Conclusion  
The judgement handed down by the Constitutional Court and its order is important for 
the purposes of the subsequent amendment to the law surrounding EAOs. The order 
and its effect which renders judicial oversight mandatory must be welcomed, as it is a 
mechanism which can remedy the abuses attached to EAOs.   
4.4 Amendments to the Magistrates Court Act  
4.4.1 Introduction  
Following the order from the Constitutional Court, the MCA was amended by the 
Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017 (hereafter referred to as the CLA).531 The 
date of commencement is yet to be fixed by proclamation in the gazette.532 The CLA, 
in terms of EAOs, seeks to further regulate the manner in which EAOs are issued.533 
The purpose behind the amendment of the MCA, regarding EAOs was to provide relief 
to debtors who found themselves being victimised by unscrupulous credit providers 
                                                          
530 This can be substantiated by the fact that in the case study referred to by the Mail and Guardian, the 
sheriff revealed that there has been a drastic reduction in the number of EAOs presented before him. 
531 GN 769 of GG 41017, 2/8/2016; 21. As per the government gazette, the President assented to the 
CLA on 31 July 2017 and published it on 2 August 2017.  
532 Section 16(1) of the CLA. 
533 To amend the Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944, so as to insert definitions; to regulate the rescission of 
judgments where the judgment debt has been paid; to further regulate jurisdiction by consent of parties; 
to regulate the factors a court must take into consideration to make a just and equitable order; to further 
regulate the payment of debts in instalments or otherwise; to further regulate consent to 
judgments and orders for the payment of judgment debts in instalments; to further regulate offers by 
judgment debtors after judgment; to further regulate the issuing of emoluments attachment orders; to 
further regulate debt collection proceedings pursuant to judgments granted by a court for a regional 
division; to further regulate the suspension of execution of a debt; to further regulate the abandonment 
of judgments; and to provide for certain offences and penalties relating to judgments, emoluments 
attachment orders and instalment orders; to amend the Superior Courts Act, 2013, so as to provide for 
the rescission of judgments by consent and the rescission of judgments where the judgment debt has 
been paid; and to provide for matters connected therewith. 
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and to help debtors who found themselves over-indebted.534 The amendments to the 
MCA for EAOs seeks to address the provisions of the MCA which plague the system 
with irregularities and abuses.535 The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee tasked with 
the amendments to the MCA acknowledged the effect of the order made by the 
Constitutional Court in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case.536 Moreover, the amendment 
of the MCA sought to give effect to the Constitutional Court order and to insert the 
required wording to give the order effect.537  
4.4.2 Amendments to the Law  
The significant aspect of the amendment pertaining to EAOs and section 65J of the 
MCA is the fact that judicial oversight is mandatory and there is now a statutory cap of 
a maximum of 25% which can be deducted from the judgement debtor’s basic salary. 
Furthermore, section 65J (2) (a) has been amended and section 65J (2) (b) (i) and (ii) 
removed in its entirety. This is indicative of a new process which would have to occur 
for an EAO to be authorised by the court and subsequently issued.       
An insertion by virtue of the CLA to section 65J (1) is that where there is more than 
one EAO against the judgement debtor’s salary, an application for another one may 
not exceed 25% of the judgement debtor’s basic salary.538  When a court is faced with 
a matter regarding the authorisation of an EAO539 or any other order in the section,540 
the court must postpone the consideration of the authorisation and set the matter down 
for hearing.541      
                                                          
534 “Portfolio Committee Amendments to the Courts of Law Amendment Bill” Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa 12 June 2017 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/170614amendments.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017 at 1.  
535 “Portfolio Committee Amendments to the Courts of Law Amendment Bill” Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa 12 June 2017 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/170614amendments.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017 at 1. 
536“Portfolio Committee Amendments to the Courts of Law Amendment Bill” Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa 12 June 2017 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/170614amendments.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017 at 2. 
537“Portfolio Committee Amendments to the Courts of Law Amendment Bill” Parliament of the Republic 
of South Africa 12 June 2017 available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/170614amendments.pdf, accessed on 6 December 2017 at 2.  
538 Section 65J (1A) (a). Basic salary is defined in section 65J (1A) (b) as the annual gross salary a 
judgement debtor is employed on divided by 12 and excludes additional remuneration for overtime or 
other allowances.  
539 Section 65J (1A) (c) (i) (aa). 
540 Section 65J (1A) (c) (i) (bb). 
541 As per section 65J (1A) (c) (i) (bb), the following must be done first: consider all submission before 
the court, call for and consider all further available documents and the court must be satisfied that other 
EAOs exist against the judgement debtor. 
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Thereafter, the party applying for the authorisation of the EAO or other order: notice 
of the date of hearing must be served on creditors, their attorneys and the judgement 
debtor (if he/she was not present or represented at the time consideration of 
authorisation for the EAO or other order was postponed).542 After the hearing and 
representations, the court can make an order regarding the amount which can be 
attached, after being satisfied that it is just and equitable and the sum of the total 
amount of the EAO is appropriate and does not exceed 25% of the judgement debtor’s 
basic salary.543     
Section 65J (2) (a) now provides that an EAO may only be issued if the court has 
authorised, after satisfying itself that it is just and equitable that an EAO be issued and 
that the attached amount is appropriate.544 It is submitted that this aspect of the 
amendment is significant as the MCA dictates that judicial oversight is mandatory. 
Moreover, it gives effect to the order made by the Constitutional Court, as envisaged 
by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. The judgement debtor and his/her employer 
must be served with a notice by the judgement creditor or his/her attorney.545 This 
notice must be in line with the form as prescribed in the Rules that the judgement 
creditor intends on having an EAO issued against the judgement debtor, in line with 
the authorisation as per section 65J (2).546    
The notice needs to contain the following information and must inform the judgement 
debtor and his/her employer:547 
• The judgement creditor intends having an EAO issued against the judgement 
debtor in accordance with the authorisation of the court;548 
• The full amount of the capital debt, interests and costs outstanding; this must 
be substantiated by a statement of account; and549 
• An EAO will be sought until the judgment debtor or his/her employer files a 
notice of intention to oppose it within ten days after service of the notice.550    
                                                          
542 Section 65J (1A) (c) (ii).  
543 Section 65J (1A) (c) (iii). 
544 Section 65J (2) (a). 
545 Section 65J (2A). 
546 Section 65J (2A). 
547 Section 65J (2B).  
548 Section 65J (2B) (a). 
549 Section 65J (2B) (b). 
550 Section 65J (2B) (c). 
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If a judgement debtor or his/her employer files a notice of intention to oppose,551 the 
grounds for opposing the issuing of an EAO must be specified.552  The grounds which 
may be used to oppose, are not limited to the following:553 amounts claimed are 
erroneous or not in accordance with the law554 or that 25% of the judgement debtor’s 
basic salary is already committed to other EAOs and that he/she will not have sufficient 
means left for his/her own maintenance or that of his/her dependants.555   
If the judgment creditor does not accept the reasons contained in a notice of intention 
to oppose, the judgement creditor of his/her attorney may then set the matter down for 
court hearing.556 In this instance, notice must be given to the judgement debtor and 
his/her employer.557 In the event that the notice of opposition is based on over 
commitment of the judgement debtor’s salary pertaining to existing court orders or 
agreements with other creditors, then notice must be given to the other judgement 
creditors or their attorneys.558      
Upon hearing all parties and satisfying itself that the EAO will be just and equitable, 
the court may:559 
• Rescind the EAO or amend it to affect the balance of the emoluments of the 
judgement debtor over and above the sufficient means necessary for his/her 
maintenance and that of his/her dependants; or560  
• Make any order, which includes an order pertaining to the division of the amount 
available to be committed to all the EAOs. This is after satisfying itself that the 
                                                          
551 A notice of intention to oppose must be accompanied by the following information (Section 65J (2C) 
(c)): 
• A certificate by the judgement debtor’s employer outlining existing court orders against the 
judgement debtor, this can also include agreements with other creditors for payment of a debt 
and costs in instalments (Section 65J (2C) (c) (i) (aa)). The certificate must also include 
amounts required by the judgement debtor for his/her necessary expenses and those of his/her 
dependants (Section 65J (2C) (c) (i) (bb)) 
• Contact details of all judgement creditors or their attorneys; and (Section 65J (2C) (c) (ii)) 
• Latest salary advice of the judgement debtor (Section 65J (2C) (c) (iii)). 
552 Section 65J (2C) (a). 
553 Section 65J (2C) (b). 
554 Section 65J (2C) (b) (i). 
555 Section 65J (2C) (b) (ii). 
556 Section 65J (2D). 
557 Section 65J (2D). 
558 Section 65J (2D). 
559 Section 65J (2E). 
560 Section 65J (2E) (a). 
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amount is appropriate and does not exceed 25% of the judgement debtor’s 
basic salary and an order as to costs.561    
Section 65J (3) (a) has been amended in its wording to now state that an EAO must 
be prepared and signed by the judgement creditor or his/her attorney. Section 65J (3) 
now includes a paragraph (b) to provide that the clerk of the court must ensure that 
the court562 has authorised the EAO563 and that the court does in fact have jurisdiction 
as per section 65J (1) (a), before the EAO is issued.564 Furthermore, the clerk of court 
must sign it and may ask either the judgement creditor or his/her attorney for more 
information.565 The clerk of court can also refer the EAO to the court, in the event that 
there is any uncertainty.566    
4.4.3 Commentary on Amendments  
It is submitted that the CLA which seeks to amend the MCA has embodied the essence 
of the Constitutional Court’s order in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgement. This 
should be hailed as a victory for the rights of judgement debtors as the law now seeks 
to provide judicial oversight in the execution process against wages/salaries. 
Moreover, this is in line with the case law which emerged from the Constitutional Court 
in respect of execution against immovable property such as: Chief Lesapo, Jaftha and 
Gundwana; this reasoning has correctly been applied to EAOs.   
As per the amendments, it appears as if the courts will play far more of an active and 
extensive role in authorising an EAO. An interesting observation is that the actual 
issuing of EAOs is a function of the clerk of courts; this is correct and in line with Zondo 
J’s judgement in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgement.  On the other hand, the court 
itself is tasked with authorising the issuing of an EAO and determining whether it is 
just and equitable.      
Regarding the 25% maximum cap which has now been introduced, it is submitted that 
the High Court and Constitutional Court in the Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgement 
would have breached the separation of powers doctrine if a statutory cap was 
proposed. It is submitted that it is the function of the legislature to make such 
                                                          
561 Section 65J (2E) (b). 
562 Section 65J (3) (b). 
563 Section 65J (3) (b) (i).  
564 Section 65J (3) (b) (ii). 
565 Section 65J (3) (b) (ii). 
566 Section 65J (3) (b) (ii). 
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determination. The maximum statutory cap of 25% could be excessive to a low-income 
judgement debtor as it would attach a significant portion of their basic salary. It is 
submitted that this one size fits all approach may not be suitable to South Africa’s 
socio-economic framework.  
The amendment dictates that the EAO must also be just and equitable. It is submitted 
that with this requirement, a court would have the onerous task of further applying their 
minds to the application for an EAO, over and above the statutory cap aspect. This 
would further safeguard a judgement debtor’s salary as a court must also consider the 
maintenance of the judgement debtor and his/her dependants, including expenses. It 
is submitted that this is a wholesome approach especially when faced with a low-
income earner. It could well be a possibility that the legislature imposed a 25% 
statutory cap to ensure that a judgement debt is settled in a shorter space of time. If, 
like the Public Finance Management Act,567 which caps an EAO for a state employee 
at 40%,568 this was applied to a non-state employee, this would have been far more 
onerous and prejudicial to a low-income earner.         
4.4.4 Foreign Comparative Analysis  
To suggest possible amendment to the MCA, a foreign comparative analysis is 
essential. The analysis is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of foreign law 
on EAOs, rather it is an overview to facilitate drawing comparisons with South Africa 
and suggesting appropriate amendment. 
In South African law, the MCA has been problematic as it did not impose a maximum 
statutory cap pertaining to the maximum amount which could be deducted from a 
judgement debtor’s salary.569 This has had the effect that unscrupulous credit 
providers, attorneys and other stakeholders in the EAO process have abused this.570 
In the absence of a statutory maximum, the result was that judgement debtors were 
                                                          
567 Act 1 of 1999. 
568 Regulation 23.3.6.  
569 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 25.  
570 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 25. 
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left with very little or absolutely nothing in terms of their salary, thus compromising 
their financial situations.571 Thus, it must be welcomed that the legislature has imposed 
a statutory maximum cap of 25%. Ideally, this should provide relief to vulnerable 
judgement debtors and their financial affairs.     
To illustrate the statutory maximum cap on a judgement debtor’s wage or salary, 
certain foreign jurisdictions impose a statutory maximum cap. For example, an 
established jurisdiction such as the United States of America,572 in title III of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act imposes a 25% statutory maximum which can be 
attached from a judgement debtor’s disposable earnings for that week.573 For the 
purposes of a statutory maximum, it is submitted that South African law should not 
adopt a fixed percentage maximum. Rather, South African law ought to create a legal 
framework whereby a comprehensive calculation based on the judgement debtor’s 
individual circumstances are considered.  
4.4.4.1 German Law 
The preferable approach is the German Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits 
certain types of income from attachment.574 A comparison is being drawn with 
Germany because it is a well-established jurisdiction with progressive laws. While 
Germany and South Africa are not on par in terms of socio-economic development, 
such suggestions can be tailored to fit in with South Africa. Furthermore, Germany has 
one of the largest economies in the world.575 
German law does not impose a statutory cap percentage, it instead categorises the 
income which the judgement debtor earns into attachment exempt thresholds.576 The 
                                                          
571 “The incidence of and undesirable practices relating to “garnishee orders” – a follow up report” 
University of Pretoria available at 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/327/2013%20garnishee%20orders%20follow%2
0up%20report.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2017 at 25. 
572 The United States of America is a developed country and a comparison is drawn to facilitate 
appropriate amendment to the position surrounding EAOs in South Africa. “Country Classification” 
United Nations available at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.p
df, accessed on 3 January 2018 at 145. 
573 § 1673.  
574 Section 850a: Such as student allowances, death benefits, allowances for expenses amongst others.  
575“Country Classification” United Nations available at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.p
df, accessed on 2 January 2018 at 145. 
576 Section 850C. Section 850C (2a) allows for the income thresholds to be revised by 1 July of every 
second year.  
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amount attached must allow for the judgement creditor to have sufficient income 
retained to fulfil his/her statutory and maintenance obligations.577   
In Germany, a judgement debtor’s earned income shall be exempted from attachment 
provided such amount does not exceed 930 euros per month, 217.50 euros per week, 
or 43.50 euros per day; this is dependent on the period of time for which it is being 
paid.578 If the judgement debtor is under a statutory obligation such as maintenance 
to a spouse, divorced spouse, relative or to a parent, then the exempted amount 
increases up to: 2,060 euros per month, 478.50 euros per week, or 96.50 euros per 
day.579 
It is submitted that the MCA in South Africa should be amended considering German 
law. This should be done by firstly, removing the 25% statutory maximum which is to 
be enforced. The legislature should consider categorising income thresholds into the 
MCA, which like Germany should be revised every year due to South Africa’s socio-
economic climate. This revision must be done by the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and the Minister of Finance, in consultation with the South 
African Reserve Bank and other stakeholders. With this amendment, judgement 
debtors would be in a far more favourable position and better off.    
It is submitted that to ensure the amendments to the MCA pertaining to EAOs are 
carried out and understood properly to allow for proper implementation, magistrates 
need to be provided with some sort of training.580 The Department of Justice and 
Correctional Service should implement an education programme, together with legal 
experts and academics. This education programme needs to clarify the current 
position on EAOs and the manner in which magistrates are expected to apply their 
minds, when faced with an application for an EAO.  
Like German law, the magistrate must do the calculations and in line with the 
Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgement, the magistrate must determine whether an 
amount is appropriate for attachment.   Furthermore, the education programme should 
                                                          
577 Section 850d. 
578 Section 850c (1). 
579 Section 850c (1). 
580 “Comments by the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) On the Working Document: Magistrates’ 
Courts Amendment Bill Relating to Amendments to Sections 36, 57, 58, 65, 65J and 86” Law Society 
of South Africa available at 
http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/documents/LSSA%20Comments%20on%20Magistrates%20Courts%2
0Amendment%20Bill.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2017 at 9 – 10. 
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also provide magistrates with mechanisms to determine what is just and equitable. 
This education programme should also apply to clerks of court as they must issue the 
EAO; the focus should be on jurisdiction and identifying if the EAO is properly 
authorised.581   
4.4.4.2 Botswana Law 
Compared to Germany and the United States of America which are established 
jurisdictions, Botswana is a country seemingly on par with South Africa.582 
Furthermore, both South Africa and Botswana have similar socio-economic and 
political conditions.583 
Regarding the procedure to obtain an EAO, it appears as if the amendments to the 
MCA are on par with Botswana.584  Civil procedure pertaining to EAOs in Botswana 
requires that the applicant for the EAO makes an ex parte application, supported by 
an affidavit stating that judgement has been obtained.585   
Moreover, for the purposes of the actual amount which can be attached, the affidavit 
must contain details stating that the judgement debtor will have sufficient means to 
maintain himself/herself and any dependants, upon the granting of the EAO.586  From 
a procedural perspective and to ensure the judgement debtor is involved throughout 
the process, he/she can oppose the confirmation of the EAO, subject to certain 
grounds.587  
It has been argued that the commendable aspect about the Botswana EAO system is 
that it requires a rule nisi to be issued first.588 Moreover, drawing from the Botswana 
                                                          
581 “Comments by the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) On the Working Document: Magistrates’ 
Courts Amendment Bill Relating to Amendments to Sections 36, 57, 58, 65, 65J and 86” Law Society 
of South Africa available at 
http://www.lssa.org.za/upload/documents/LSSA%20Comments%20on%20Magistrates%20Courts%2
0Amendment%20Bill.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2017 at 10.  
582 “Botswana” South African History Online available at http://www.sahistory.org.za/places/botswana, 
accessed on 7 December 2017. 
583 “Country Classification” United Nations available at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.p
df, accessed on 2 January 2018 at 146. 
584 Order 36 of the Statutory Instrument No 13 of 2011 of the Rules of the Magistrates Court.  
585 Order 36 rule 1.  
586 Order 36 rule 1 (1) (e). 
587 Order 36 rule 3 (1) (a) – (e). 
588 A Swana Emoluments Attachment Orders: In Light of the Widespread Fraudulent and Undesirable 
Practices in Emoluments Attachment Orders Should this Debt Collection Mechanism Continue to Exist? 
(LLM Thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, 2015) at 82.  
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civil procedure, its inclusion in South African law would allow for the involvement of 
the judgement debtor in the proceedings.589 An advantageous factor of the rule nisi 
aspect is that it allows for a judgement debtor to appear before court and contest the 
EAO.590 The amendments to the MCA dictate that a notice must be issued to the 
judgement debtor before the actual EAO is granted. It is submitted that this new 
procedural aspect is in line with the Botswana EAO position. Furthermore, it is deemed 
to be a valuable mechanism in debt collection as it could see a reduction in the abuses 
prevalent in the EAO system.  
Like German law, civil procedure in Botswana does not impose a statutory maximum 
pertaining to the amount which can be attached from a judgement debtor’s 
wage/salary. The law in Botswana dictates that the court must be satisfied that the 
judgement debtor will have sufficient income to maintain himself and any 
dependants.591 It is submitted that this will be insufficient to South African law due to 
the various abuses surrounding EAOs. Furthermore, South African law requires a 
framework like German law regarding the amount which can be attached from a 
judgement debtor’s wage/salary. 
4.4.4.3 United Kingdom (England and Wales) 
The United Kingdom is a well-developed jurisdiction, with a markedly different socio-
economic landscape to South Africa.592 Nonetheless, the United Kingdom’s legal 
position on EAOs can serve to facilitate comparisons with South African law. 
The Attachment of Earnings Act 1971 utilises a protected earnings rate, to determine 
the amount which can be attached from a judgement debtor’s earnings.593 This must 
be conducted in a manner which encompasses the judgement debtor’s resources and 
needs. Moreover, the court must be satisfied that such deduction is reasonable.594 A 
                                                          
589 A Swana Emoluments Attachment Orders: In Light of the Widespread Fraudulent and Undesirable 
Practices in Emoluments Attachment Orders Should this Debt Collection Mechanism Continue to Exist? 
(LLM Thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, 2015) at 82. 
590 A Swana Emoluments Attachment Orders: In Light of the Widespread Fraudulent and Undesirable 
Practices in Emoluments Attachment Orders Should this Debt Collection Mechanism Continue to Exist? 
(LLM Thesis, University of KwaZulu Natal, 2015) at 82. 
591 Order 36 rule 1 (1) (e).  
592“Country Classification” United Nations available at 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.p
df, accessed on 3 January 2018 at 145. 
593 Section 6 (5) (b). 
594 Section 6 (5) (b). 
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county court is empowered to issue an EAO for the payment of a judgement debt, 
other than a debt of less than five pounds or other such sum as prescribed by county 
court rules.595  
The process to determine the attached amount is articulated in Schedule 3 of the 
Attachment of Earnings Act. The Schedule requires that in the case of a repayment 
for a judgement debt, an employer deduct the amount of the excess or the normal 
deduction, whichever is less if the attachable earnings exceed protected earnings.596 
A deduction is prohibited if the attachable earnings are equal to, or less than the 
protected earnings.597  
The United Kingdom expressly prohibits the attachment of certain amounts as it does 
not constitute earnings,598 these include: sums payable by any public department,599 
pay or allowances received as a member of the Queen’s forces,600 pension, 
allowances,601 disability grants602 and wages payable to a person as a seaman.603  
The County Court Rules 1981 outlines the process for an attachment of earnings 
order.604 A judgement creditor files an application for an attachment of earnings, with 
a copy for service on the judgement debtor in the jurisdiction where the judgement 
debtor resides.605 This application must entail a certified copy of the order606 and the 
amount under the order.607 Thereafter, once these documents have been filed, the 
court official will set down a date for hearing the application.608 Within eight days after 
service on the judgement debtor, he/she must file a reply609 and upon such receipt of 
the reply, the court official will then send a copy to the applicant.610      
                                                          
595 Section 1 (2) (b). 
596 Part 1 of Schedule 3. 
597 Part 1 of Schedule 3. 
598 Section 24 (2).  
599 Section 24 (2) (a). 
600 Section 24 (2) (b). 
601 Section 24 (2) (c). 
602 Section 24 (2) (d). 
603 Section 24 (2) (e). 
604 Order 27. 
605 Order 27, section 4 (1).  
606 Order 27, section 4 (1) a). 
607 Order 27, section 4 (1) (b). 
608 Order 27, section 4 (2). 
609 Order 27, section 5 (1). 
610 Order 27, section 5 (3).  
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The commendable aspect about the MCA amendments and the legal position 
regarding EAOs in the United Kingdom is the mandatory hearing. The amendments to 
the MCA require that a hearing before a magistrate be conducted before the 
authorisation of the EAO. It is submitted that regarding the hearing, South African law 
will be on par with the United Kingdom, once the amendments to the MCA come into 
operation. 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
The new procedure to obtain an EAO, as per the MCA amendments are seemingly on 
par with the above mentioned foreign jurisdictions, in terms of procedure and the 
involvement of judicial oversight. Like Botswana, a judgement debtor in South Africa 
will be more involved in the process now. Moreover, the abuses and irregularities 
which were prevalent in the EAO system by virtue of a lack of judicial oversight are 
now seemingly remedied. The amendments to the MCA allows for the judgement 
debtor to oppose the application for an EAO and creates a system of inclusion for all 
stakeholders to be involved in the process, before the order can be granted. It is 
submitted that for the MCA amendments to be fully on par with foreign law such as 
Germany, the 25% percentage maximum ought to be removed and replaced with a 
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4.5 Conclusion  
As alluded to in previous chapters,611 the EAO process was in dire need of judicial 
oversight due to the abuses prevalent in the process. 
This chapter discussed the High Court and Constitutional Court judgements from the 
Stellenbosch Law Clinic judgement. From the High Court and majority judgements in 
the Constitutional Court, the Judges sought to give effect to the section 34 
constitutionally entrenched right. Moreover, the Judges amplified the law on EAOs and 
applied the reasoning from cases based on immovable property to execution in the 
form of EAOs. As opposed to adopting an overall approach of notional severance, the 
law was remedied by the Constitutional Court through the joint interpretive mechanism 
of reading in and severance.  
After the Constitutional Court judgement, the amendments to the MCA were assented 
to by the President almost a year later. These amendments are yet to come into force, 
thus, we await a commencement date. The essence of the majority judgements from 
the Constitutional Court are embodied in the amendments as now the court plays a 
far more active role in the EAO process. In order for these amendments to become 
fully operational and attain the legislature’s objectives, they need to be understood 
and applied correctly. Moreover, there needs to be amendment regarding the statutory 
cap.   
Education plays a pivotal role in the debt collection industry, thus magistrates and 
court clerks who will be tasked with authorisation and subsequent issuing need to 
ensure that they do understand the process well. From the judgments and 
amendments discussed above, it is well understood that the judiciary and legislature 
concurred with the general call for the inclusion of judicial oversight in the EAO 
process. If applied correctly, judicial oversight will be the solution to improving the law 
on EAOs as magistrates, by virtue of their legal knowledge are far more capable of 




                                                          
611 See chapter 3.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
5.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to examine whether a link exists between reckless credit and 
EAOs. While there are little concrete statistics to prove such link, anecdotal evidence 
in the form of case law,612 research reports613 and articles614  illustrates that the link is 
definitively in existence. 
Reckless lending occurs when an unscrupulous credit provider is given documents 
from a consumer regarding their financial position, he/she either conducts no pre-
agreement assessment or ignores the outcome of one, thus engaging in reckless 
credit practices when credit is granted. This link exists because some credit providers 
utilise unscrupulous methods to ensure that a consumer defaults on the credit 
agreement, thus an EAO is a form of security for repayment.  
South Africa has an over-indebted society with many consumers who rely on credit to 
access goods and services. In order to obtain credit, the NCA specifically prohibits the 
granting of reckless credit, to curtail over-indebtedness. This is in line with the 
legislature’s intention to enhance consumer protection and promote a healthy credit 
market.  To achieve this, a thorough pre-agreement assessment ought to be the 
foundation to good credit practices. This research sought to prove that if a pre-
agreement assessment is flawed, it is almost inevitable that default would occur which 
in many instances may lead to an EAO.  
                                                          
612 University of Stellenbosch Legal Aid Clinic and Others v Minister of Justice And Correctional Services 
and Others (16703/14) [2015] ZAWCHC 99; 2015 (5) SA 221 (WCC); [2015] 3 All SA 644 (WCC); 
(2015) 36 ILJ 2558 (WCC) (8 July 2015). 
613 “The incidence of and the undesirable practices relating to garnishee orders in South Africa” The 
National Credit Regulator available at https://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/research-
reports/oct08/GARNISHEE-ORDERS-STUDY-REPORT.pdf. “The incidence of and undesirable 




614 B Whittle “LSSA condemns unscrupulous garnishee practices” (2013) De Rebus 13. 
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To strengthen the argument that the EAO process is flawed, BASA released a joint 
statement with National Treasury,615 evidenced by statistics illustrating how flawed the 
EAO process is and the prevalence of over-indebtedness in consumers. Moreover, 
BASA advised its members against utilising EAOs, thus acknowledging the 
unscrupulous methods and irregularities in the EAO system.616 Furthermore, research 
conducted by the University of Pretoria revealed the irregularities and unethical 
practices surrounding EAOs.617 There appears to be a move to changing debt 
collection practices pertaining to EAOs, which this dissertation evaluated and 
proposed amendment for.        
The first chapter provided an overview of the dissertation, including its aims and 
research questions. This chapter created a framework demonstrating the research 
problem, through statistics obtained from the NCR618 that South Africans are indeed 
in a state of over-indebtedness and unable to satisfy their debt obligations. From the 
perspective of the overall research problem at hand, this was significant as a link could 
be drawn to financial ignorance.619 Moreover, unscrupulous credit providers take 
undue advantage of the fact that consumers are desperate for credit, thus it is provided 
in a reckless manner, which eventually culminates in an EAO.        
The second chapter examined the concept of reckless credit in South African law. It 
clearly demonstrated that prior to amendment, credit providers were given an unlimited 
amount of freedom to determine their own evaluative mechanisms and models, when 
conducting pre-agreement assessments.620 This led to issues and instances of 
                                                          
615 “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
%20Ministry%20of%20Finance#sthash.hKYm8Xzt, accessed on 5 January 2018. 
616 “Ensuring responsible market conduct for bank lending” Insurance Times and Investment News 
available at http://views.itinews.co.za/Views/ViewArticle.aspx?Article=7EE1B5F8-9681-4945-80B1-
0A1D8C0372C2&CID=21806&Company=National%20Treasury%20-
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reckless lending as there was no conformity in the credit industry and neither could 
the quality of these assessments be measured.621 Apart from the shortcomings in the 
NCA, the chapter proposed amendment in the form of the inclusion of external market 
factors in pre-agreement assessments, in an attempt to enhance the quality of credit 
provided and curtail reckless lending.622      
The third chapter formed the crux of the argument and aimed to effectively answer the 
main research problem i.e. whether a link exists between reckless credit and EAOs. 
The chapter examined certain examples of reckless lending practices to demonstrate 
how consumers are trapped in a cycle of debt.623 The most authoritative source was 
the High Court judgement from the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case. The chapter also 
considered the impact of financial ignorance and importance of educational awareness 
that credit providers ought to engage in.624 Moreover, the section 129 notice needs to 
be clearly understood by consumers. Prior to the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, the 
research reports by the University of Pretoria625 highlighted various abuses prevalent 
in the EAO process. From this, the call for judicial oversight became strong.              
The fourth chapter critically analysed the High Court626 and Constitutional Court627 
judgements from the Stellenbosch Law Clinic case, to ascertain whether judicial 
oversight is required to improve the law on EAOs. The focal points of both judgements 
were the arguments and binding points about judicial oversight. In determining the 
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current regulation of EAOs, chapter four analysed the amendments to the MCA which 
makes judicial oversight mandatory and imposes a statutory maximum of 25% which 
can be deducted from a judgement debtor’s wage/salary.628 The chapter undertook a 
foreign comparative analysis with Germany,629 to propose a potential amendment to 
the law of EAOs, as the 25% statutory cap may be inappropriate for South Africa. A 
foreign comparative analysis was also conducted with Botswana and the United 
Kingdom (England and Wales) to determine whether the amendments to the MCA are 
on par with foreign law.  From the discussion in chapter four, it was evident that judicial 
oversight is the solution to improving the law on EAOs.       
5.2 Recommendations  
Considering the above, this research makes the following recommendations.   
5.2.1 The Inclusion of External Market Factors In the NCA 
Chapter two630 criticised the NCA for a failure to include external market factors into a 
pre-agreement assessment.631 The chapter emphasised the importance of this 
inclusion as South Africa has a volatile economy combined with predatory lending 
practices. 
In order to address this perceived shortcoming, which it is submitted will strengthen 
the quality of pre-agreement assessments, it is recommended that: 
5.2.1.1) Credit providers must conduct a stress test of a consumer to determine 
the sensitivity of a consumer to external market factors.632  
5.2.1.2) In order to implement this, the legislature must make provision for the 
inclusion of external market factors in pre-agreement assessments. In doing 
this, the industry which the consumer is employed in must be a vital 
consideration and how volatile a particular industry is.  
                                                          
628 Courts of Law Amendment Act 7 of 2017. 
629 German Code of Civil Procedure.  
630 See 2.4.  
631 S De Wet… et al “Measuring the effect of the national credit act on indebtedness in South Africa” 
(2015) 8 (1) Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences. 
632 S De Wet… et al “Measuring the effect of the national credit act on indebtedness in South Africa” 
(2015) 8 (1) Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 100. 
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5.2.1.3) Furthermore, the happenings of the industry must also be considered. 
Chapter two633 provided an example of a miner and the consideration of protest 
action which must be taken into account. 
5.2.1.4) When considering which factors are relevant in an affordability 
assessment, government must consult together with the relevant stakeholders 
such as the NCR, credit providers, actuaries, consumer protection experts, 
lawyers and economists.  
5.2.1.5) It is recommended that these factors and a mandatory stress test form 
part of the affordability assessment guidelines.  
5.2.1.6) When a credit provider conducts a stress test to determine the extent 
of the consumer’s sensitivity to external market factors, it is recommended that 
provision is made for an appropriate percentage buffer.  
5.2.1.7) It is submitted that over and above the buffer which makes provision 
for living expenses and to reduce over-indebtedness, further provision must 
also be made for an external economic factor such as recession or 
unemployment amongst others. 
5.2.2 Further Education and Awareness for Consumers 
Chapter three634 identified how fatal financial ignorance can be when consumers 
conclude agreements.635   
For consumers to be educated about their financial decisions, credit providers such as 
banks and other stakeholders must embark upon education programmes. Such 
programmes need to educate consumers about key financial terms and concepts like 
interest, reckless credit and which administrative body can be approached for dispute 
resolution. It is submitted that this must also include education about legal concepts, 
the legal consequences of reckless lending and default. Moreover, this must be 
available in plain and understandable language and if possible, translated into a 
language which the consumer understands. Ideally, over and above financial 
                                                          
633 See 2.4.  
634 See 3.2.  
635 J Campbell “Restoring Rational Choice: The Challenge of Consumer Financial Regulation” (2016) 
Sloan Foundation Economic Research Paper No. 2719330 17. 
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institutions embarking upon education programmes, schools must build financial 
education into their curriculums as it is an essential life skill.      
Chapter three636 made recommendations in line with the First National Bank – Be 
Financially Smart program. It is recommended that credit providers like banks and 
other stake holders create programs like this, with a focal point of educating 
consumers to enable them to make wise financial decisions. This will assist them in 
identifying certain red flags and making appropriate decisions.     
5.2.3 Further Training for Magistrates and Court Clerks 
Since there has been considerable amendment to the MCA 637and judicial officers like 
magistrates are now required to play a far more active role, further training needs to 
be provided.   
It is recommended that the Department of Justice and Correctional Service should 
implement an education programme, together with legal experts and academics. This 
education programme needs to clarify the current position on EAOs and the manner 
in which magistrates are expected to apply their minds, when faced with an application 
for an EAO. In light of the just and equitable requirements as per the amendments, the 
education program needs to include mechanisms to assist magistrates to effectively 
apply their minds.    
Furthermore, this must also be extended to include court clerks as the new 
amendments to the MCA require that they actually issue the EAO. Moreover, court 
clerks must also ensure that the jurisdiction requirements are correctly applied. As the 
University of Pretoria identified court clerks as not having sufficient knowledge about 
the EAO process, this education program is also vital as skills development. 
This further education will also be required, as the proposed recommendation below 
requires a significant calculation to be conducted by a magistrate when determining 
the portion of a salary which can be attached. As this will involve a thorough 
mathematical calculation, magistrates must be trained and given proper guidelines to 
conduct these calculations. Moreover, this education programme needs to equip 
magistrates to apply their minds to determine a just and equitable outcome.          
                                                          
636 See 3.2.  
637 See 4.4.  
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5.2.4 Amendment to the MCA Regarding the 25% Statutory Cap – Adopting the 
German Law Approach 
Chapter four638 recommended that the 25% statutory maximum cap be removed as it 
is unsuitable to South Africa. Moreover, this one size fits all approach adopted by the 
legislature could be detrimental to low income consumers.  
The recommendation is that the MCA in South Africa be amended in light of German 
law. This should be done by firstly, removing the 25% statutory maximum which can 
be attached from a judgement debtor’s salary/wage. In adopting the German approach 
to the MCA, certain income such as: social grants, student allowances, bonuses which 
should be capped at a certain amount which can be deducted and expenses for 
employment should be prohibited from attachment.639  
The German Code of Civil Procedure allows for certain income to be attached, under 
certain conditions such as: earnings from third parties and pension to be paid for an 
injury amongst others.640 It is submitted that owing to the socio-economic climate of 
South Africa, this should not be adopted into South African law as it may defeat the 
just and equitable requirement and compromise consumers’ financial affairs.         
The legislature should consider categorising income thresholds into the MCA, like 
German law. In order to implement this, the financial affairs of the low income earners 
should be given preference when categorising income and as such, this group should 
not be subjected to unreasonable thresholds. To categorise the income thresholds, 
government must appoint a commission consisting of financial and wealth experts. 
The commission ought to gather socio-economic statistics to determine how income 
ought to be categorised.  
It is submitted that this should be revised every year due to South Africa’s socio-
economic climate. Moreover, this revision must be done by the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and the Minister of Finance, in consultation with the South 
African Reserve Bank and other stakeholders. In accordance with transparency and 
with an aim to reduce debt levels in South Africa, the Minister of Finance and Minister 
                                                          
638 See 4.4.  
639 Section 850a of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
640 Section 850b of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
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of Justice and Constitutional Development should address the relevant parliamentary 
committees on this process regularly.       
When a matter of attachment is before a Magistrate, a calculation must be done 
whereby the income thresholds are taken into account, necessary expenses and 
statutory obligations deducted, along with any other amounts necessary for the 
upkeep and maintenance of the judgment debtor must be considered. Thereafter, 
considering the amount left over, the Magistrate should make a just and equitable 
determination regarding the amount which can be attached from a judgement debtor’s 
salary. It is submitted that a Magistrate should also investigate the fairness of the 
overall judgement debt and remove any unlawful costs.      
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